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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Carl R. Rogers is a psychologist, not a philosopher by
protession.
~xamines
~heory

But there is much justitication tor a thesis whieh

in detail the major philosophieal implications ot his

ot personality; tor as the originator of a well-known

~herapeutic

method--non-directive or client-centered therapy--

Rogers has become a center ot much controversy both tor the
",heory ot personality he has tormulated to account tor his psyeho",herapeutic experience and tor the philosophical positions that
~derlie

~hese
~hey

this theory.

It is therefore important to realize what

positions are and also what is the major criticism to which
have been subjected.
Rogers has clearly recognized the importance of having a

proper philosophy of man in order to construct an adequate theory
~t

personality. and he has explicitly attempted to tormulate his

;>hilosopby.
~nsulted

~e

He mentions that today most psychologists would feel

if accused of thinking philosophical thoughts but that

himself does not share this reaction, tor he cannot help

puzzling over the meaning ot what he has seen. 1

He points out

lCarl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Thera;Eist's View
(Boston: Hough£onMlff1In Co., 19b1), p. 163.

~J I!s'tcfaothetq~

I

2

that it is impossible to engage in psychotherapeutic work without
at least acting according to an underlying set of values and a
asic view of what man is, even though the therapist may not
explicitly formulate the philosophy which he practices. 2 Rogers
emphasizes that the philosophy determines the therapist.'

If

the therapist sees man as an object to be dissected, diagnosed,
and manipulated, his approach to counseling will reflect this
attitude; and the therapist will consider it not only preferable
ut a strict duty to take the responsibility for directing the
ife of the person who has come to him for help.

If on the other

and his philosophy stresses man's ability for self-direction and
self-responsibility, counseling will reflect this attitude.
However, in Rogers· eyes philosophy is important not only
or the psychologist who is a therapist.

Rogers asks his fellow

sychologists to realize that 'What they do as scientists will
ave implications far beyond the purely scientific meaning ot
their findings, just as the work ot atomic physicists necessarily
has important social meanings for humanity. 4

This problem is

ecoming increasingly obvious in contemporary SOCiety, where the
of Man,1t Journal of

3
state is assuming more and more responsibility for directing the
various socio-economic activities of man.

Are the "planners" of

the modern complex state to use the discoveries of the social
scientists in a way that will further or diminish the dignity of
the individual man?

The answer to this question will depend to a

very large extent on the philosophy not only of the "planners"
~ut

also of the social scientists themselves, who necessarily

prientate their investigations according to their personal philosophy of man.

~ation

Rogers calls attention to the utopia of manipu-

envisioned by B. F. Skinner in Walden Tw0 5 as an example

pf what some psychologists are apparently seriously proposing as
~he

end point of the evolution of the modern state.

Huxley's

~atiric Brave New world6 also vividly portrays the loss of
personhood associated with increasing psychological and biologi-

~al knowledge. 7 One's philosophical outlook on the individual,
will determine one's philosophical outlook on society as a

~hen,
~hole.

If the philosophical supposition is that men are free and

papable of self-direction, then a responsible democratic order
~ill

~

be achieved; if this is denied, the society will be at best

Walden Two wherein individuals submit to a subtle manipUlation

py experts rather than actively directing the course of their own
~948).

5B• F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macm.illa.n Co.,

6AldOUS Huxley, Brave New Norld (New York: Harper and
Bros., 1946).
?Rogers, On Becomipg a Person • •• , p. 214.

4

~nique lives. 8
More and more in recent years, then, Rogers has turned his
9.ttention to the basic philosophical foundation of his ap.proach,
seeking to determine the nature of man andlihe implications of
the answer to this question.

It is these questions and the

answers to them that Rogers gives that will be examined in this
The primary intention is to present what Rogers and his

~hesis.
~ri tic's

have

~valuation

said concerning these points, and is not to offer an

either of Rogerst own positions or of the criticism of

f,ihem, except in places where it is relevant to offer some interpal criticism of the positions.
An

aid in understanding Rogers' philosophical positions is

some knowledge of his background. 9
Rogers was born in Oak Park, Illinois, on January 8, 1902.
{e mentions that the family religion was a highly conservative
~rotestantism;
~o

and when he was twelve, the growing family .oved

a farm. leaving behind what were considered to be the tempta-

~ions

of suburban life.

Here Rogers became deeply interested in

8 Carl R. Rogers, "Divergent Trends in Methods of Improving
'i.djustment," Harve.rd Educational Review, XlIX (1948), 212, 2189.::;,uoted in Rogers, Client-Centered 'l'herapy • • • t pp. 224-25.

9The following synopsis of Rogers' life is taken from:

~arl R. Rogers, "A Theory of TherapYt Personality, and Interper~onal Relationships As Developed in the Client-Centered Frame~ork, It P~;ycholof1:Y: A Study of a SCience, Vol. III: Formulations

~f

the Person and the Social Context, ed. S. Koch (New York:
1'j59), pp. 185-88; Rogers, qn BecominE5 a Ferson
•• , pp. ;,-15; Arthur W. Melton, 'HChe A})A, Distinguished
)cientific Contribution Awarus for 1956, II AmeriCan PSlcho1oE5ist,
II (1957), 128-29.
dcGraw-H~ll,

5
scientific farming and acquired a knowledge of and a respect for
the methods of practical science.

This led him to enter the

University of 'Nisconsin as an agricultural student.

However

after his second year in college. as a result of some emotionally
charged student religious conferences he transferred into history, believing that studies in this area would
~im

for the ministry.

better~:r

epare

A trip to China during his junior year for

an international World Student Christian Federation Conference at
~hich

he cams to realize that sincere and honest people could

hold very divergent religious beliefs resulted in the final
rejection of his family's dogmatic views on religion; and he
entered the liberal Union Theological Seminary in New York City
after graduation from Wisconsin in 1921.1-.

Rogers comments that

the seminary at this time was deeply committed to freedom of
philosophical thought and respected the sincere attempts of
stUdents to think their way through the problems that they them.selves raised.

Rogers took the opportunity to think himself

right out of religious work, saying that he could not intellectually justify committing himself to a field of work in which he
would have to believe in some Apecific doc Grine.

His views had

changed so much during his collc3e years that he could not be
sure they would not continue to change.
Rogers next entered

Teec~er's

College, ColumbiA Univer-

sity, where he was introduced to clinical psychology.

The fol-

lowing year he was granted an internship at the new Institute for

6

Child Guidance in New York City.
~etween

Here he realized the conflict

the two different worlds of psychology he was living in:

the highly Freudian approach to personality at the Institute, and
the rigorously scientific and coldly objective statistical and
Thorndikean views at Teacher's College.
The next twelve years (1928-1940) were spent in a community child guidance center at Rochester, New York.

The staff at

this center was eclectic and Rogers was exposed to a wide variety
of methods.

He published his first major work, The Clinical

Treatment of the Problem Chlld,lO in 1939.

He had meanwhile

received his M.A. in 1928 and his Ph.D. in 1931 from Columbia.
In 1940 Rogers accepted a professorship in psychology at
Ohio state University_

He admits that the shift to university

teaching on a full-time schedule was a sharp one, but one which
proved profitable in that his ideas were subjected to the intellectual curiosity of graduate students who were eager to learn
and to contribute through theory and research to the development
of this field of knowledge.

His first book on

no~-directive

therapy, Counseling and PsychotheraPl,ll was published in 1942.
In 1945 Rogers moved to the Counseling Center of the
University of Chicago where his approach to psychotherapy continually developed as he gained more and more experience and
10Carl R. Rogers, The Clinical Treatment of the Problem
Phild (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19~9).
llCarl R. Rogers, Counseliag and PsychotheraEl (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942).

7
subjected his findings to further empirical research.

During

this period he wrote Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implicatio~ns, and Theory12 and. itA Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships As Developed in the
Client-Centered Framework. 'f 13
Since 1957 Rogers has been at the University of Wisconsin
where he is investigating the possibilities of using his psychothera.peutic method for helping psychotic patients.

His last

major work, On Bacomin6 a Person: A Therapist's View of the Good
was published in 1961.
-Life,l4Rogers
was president of

the American Association for

Applied Psychology in 1944-45, of the American Psychological
Association in 1946-47. of the Division of Clinical and Abnormal
Psychology in 1949-50, and of the American Academy of Psychotherapists in 1956.

He received an American Psychological Asso-

ciation Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award in 1956.
Rogers, of course, has not developed his theories in a
vacuum but has been influenced both by the men and by the ideas
with which he has come into contact.

In an article on the devel-

opment of client-centered therapy, Raskin traces some of the nondirective concepts that were antecedent to Rogers and which
l2Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy. • • •
l3Rogers,

It

A

Theory of Therapy • •

.,If

14Rogers, On Becomi9S a Person. • • •

in -och (ad.).

8

~ecame assimilated into his thought. 15 Raskin mentions Freud,
Otto Rank, Jessie Taft, and Frederick H. Allen.

Freud had some

non-directive inclinations in his work inasmuch as he came to
place more and more emphasis on the attitudes of the patient
rather than upon the will and direction of the analyst.

Otto

Rank, the primary early influence on Rogers,l6 differed from
Freud in centering his attention upon the creative powers at the
individual's will rather than considering the patient a battleground of such impersonal forces as id and superego, in looking
upon the aim of therapy as acceptance of oneself as unique and
self-reliant and capable of positive self-direction, in making
the patient the central figure in the therapeutic relationship,
and in believing that the goals of therapy are achieved not
through exploration of the past but through experience of the
present.

Jessie Taft, Rankls translator and aSSOCiate, further

developed Rank's ideas; and Frederick Allen carried on the
R3.nkian emphases and explicitly developed the notion of man's
innate potency and urge toward growth and individual responsibility.
Rogers has also frequently acknowledged his debt to many
15Nathaniel J. Raskin, tiThe Development of Non-Directive
Therapy," Journal of Consultines PSlchology, XII (1948), 92-109.
l6Rogers, Counseling and PSlchotherapf' p. 440. Rogers
mentions that the concepts underlying thIs i rst book on nondirective counseling are much influenced by the Rankian group; he
refers the reader to Otto H::ink, ',vill TheraDY (l~ew York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1936). Milton L. Blum and Benjamin Balinsky discuss the
influence of Rank on Rogers in Counseling and P~y~hology (New
!YOT"lr! "Pl"t:mtica-Hall

Tn('

1 QC;l 1

n

107,

9

contemporary psychologists whose ideas have influenced his
theories. 17
Rogers' own experience has gradually led him away from
viewing the human person solely .from the standpoint of logical
~ositivism.

He now prefers to view man from the standpoint of an

approach which has tOday been labelled "existential psychology":
I see a great need for creative thinking and theorizing in
regard to the methods of social science. There ~ a rather
widespread feeling in our group that the logical posittvism
in which we were professionally reared. is not necessarily the
final philosophical word in an area in 'Nhich the phenomenon
of subjectivity~}lays such a vital and central part. Have we
evolved the optimal method for apprOXimating the truth in
this area? Is there some view. possibly developing out of an
existentialist orientation, which might preserve the values
of logical positivism and the scientific advances which it
has helped to foster and yet find more room for the existing
subjective person !So is at; the heart and base even of our
system of science?
He contrasts the traditional American objective trend in psychology, which is nonhumanistic, impersonal. and. based on knowledge
pf animal learning, with the existentis.l, more humanistic trend
of European psychology.
~djectives

The lotter trend is characterized by

such as phenomenological, existential,

person-centere~

by concepts such as selt-actualizatj.on, becoming, growth; by
~ndividuals
~aslow,

(in this country) such as Gordon Allport, Abraham

and Rollo May.

It is with this group of men that Rogers

17ct• t e.g., Carl R. Pogers. "gome Observa.tions on the
prganization of Personality,n American Psychologist, II (1947),
~66-68; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy • • • ,tI in Koch (ed.),
p. 19i~; Rogers, On Becoming a I)erson • • ., pp. 128, 215.
l8 Rogers, A Theory of Therapy • • .,!r in Koch (ed.),
p. 251.
If

10

would like to place himself, believing that the existential
approach more adequately accounts for the whole range of human
rt>ehavior. 19

19Carl R. Rogers, "Two Divergent Trends," Existential

ad. Rollo May (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 88.
For a general discussion of the inadequacy of the positivistic,
rt>ehavioristic viewpoint, consult Carl R. Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person" (unpublished paper prepared for a symposium
on "Behav1orism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern
Psychology-It at Rice University, Houston, Texas, March 20-22,
1963), pp. 15-37.
~sychology,

CHAPTER II
Pl~~RSONALITY

THE

THEORY OF CARL ROGEHS

Rogers' personality theory has gradually developed through
the continual interplay of therapeutic experience, abstract conceptualizing, and research using operationally defined terminology.1

The most important of these is Rogers' own personal clini-

cal experienee;2 he believes that a theory constructed from one's
own experience can avoid the charge of being merely armchair
speculation.
A point to note in approaching the following synopsis of

Rogers' personality theory is that the theory is constantly being
modified in the light of further experience and research. 3

The

major directions of the theory have not markedly changed; but
there have been changes in the constructs and organization of the
theory, and Rogers expects this ongoing process of revision to
continue.
lRogerst "A Theory of Therapy • • • ," in Koch (ed.),
p. 194. Cf. Rogers, ItSome Observations on the Organization of
Personality," 358.
2RogerS, On Becomias a Person • • • , p. 32.
3Rogers,
p. 244; Rogers,

II

A Theory of Therapy • • ., ff in Koch (ed.),

Client~Centered

Therapy • • • , p.
11

17.
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The following, then,is a summary of Rogers' personality
theory as it has been developed up to this time. 4 The structural
constructs of personality will be examined first.
The total individual considered as an organized whole is
referred to as the organism.

The phenomenal field is the exper-

iential field of which the organism 1s the center.

In his 1951

book Rogers describes the phenomenal field as the totality of
experience, that is, all of the IIsensory and visceral experiences" going on within the organism at any given moment regardless
of whether or not the individual is conscious of them. 5

By 1953,

when Rogers formulated his theories in detail at the request of
the American Psychological Association, he preferred to use the
term experience rather than phenomenal fieldj6 and he made more
explicit the notion that the term includes only that experience
4This summary is ts.ken mainly from: Carl R. Rogers, "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy," American Ps.ycholoIgist, I (1946), 415-22; Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy • • • t
pp. 489-533; Rogers, "A Theor;y of Therapy • • • ,If in Koch (ed.),
pp. 184-233. Summaries of Rogers' personality theory as it is
explained in Client-Centered Thera~ • • • are found in Calvin
s. Hall and Gardner EinazeYt l'beorJ.es or Personality (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957). pp. 4'8-89; Nicholas Hobbs,
rtClient-Centered Psychotherapy," Six APEroaches to Psychotheral2l,
ed. James L. McCary (New York: Dryaen Press. 1955), pp. 51-58.
5Rogers, Client-Centered TheraPl • ~, p. 483.
6RogerS, itA Theory of Therapy • • • ," in Koch (ed.),
p. 197. The term phenomenal field has been used in various ways
and has more connotations than the relatively neutral term eXEerience. Cf., M. B. Smith's objection to the use of ~henomenal
If!elg in liThe Phenomenological Approach in Personality Theory:
Scme Critical Remarl{s," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol£Sl, XVL (1950), 516-22.
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which is potentially available to consciousness.

The psychologi-

cal aspects of hunger. for example. would be included in experience since a person can turn bis attention to the tact of hunger
even though be now happens to be so engrossed in work that he is

not aware ot this need. but a change in the sugar count of the
blood would not be included.

The verb experience means to

reeeive in the organism the impact ot the sensor,T or physiological events which are bappening at the moment.
The terms

awarene~~f

sZ!boliz!tion, and

used syn0Q1mously by Rogers.

conseiousnes~

are

Consciousness or awareness is the

symbolic representation (although not necessarily in verbal sym018) of some part

ot experience.

This representation can have

varying degrees of vividness.
Perceetion is a hypothesis tor action which comes into
eing in awareness when stimuli impinge on the organism.

Thus it

is a more narrow term than awareness since perception emphasizes
the importance ot an external stimulUS whereas awareness can
refer to purel3 internal stimuli.
~potbe81s

By defining perception as a

tor action, Rogers means that when we perceive an

object (for example, Itthis person is my mother") we are malting a
prediction that the object tram which the stimu.li are received
ould, it checked in other ways, exhibit properties whicb we have
COme to regard, beCause ot past experience, as being characteristic of that object.
Subceptlon signifies di;::,crimination wi thout awareness.
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This is the capacity of the organism to discriminate on a preconscious level an experience as threatening without the individual being aware of the threat.
The self, which is the central structural concept in
Rogers' theory of personality,? is a differentiated portion of
the total perceptual field of the organism.

It is the conscious

sense of autonomy, the awareness of being and functioning.

It is

a gestalt composed of the perceptions and concepts of the characteristics and abilities and goals of the ItI'I or time" and the
relationships of the !tI" or "me" to various aspects of life,
together with the values attached to these perceptions and concepts.

Although at any given moment it could in theor,r be com-

pletely known. Rogers pOints out that in practice this would
probably be impossible since as a gestalt it is a continually
changing even though usually consistent process.

He admits that

as a construct the self could be defined in various ways but
prefers to include in his definition only experience which

~

available to awareness although not necessarily now in awareness.
He feels that a definition of the self which includes unconscious
material that cannot be brought into awareness would be impossible to handle operationally.8
The ideal

!!ll denotes the self-concept which the

?Rogers. Client-Centered TherapY • •• , pp. 12, l36-3?
8Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy • • • ,It in Koch (ed.),
pp. 202-203.
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individual would most like to possess.

In all other respects it

is the same as the self-concept.
The question arises as to how the self-structucture is
formed out of the total field.

Rogers believes that it develops

as a result of interaction with the environment and especially as
a result of evaluationsl interaction with other peop1e. 9
ir~ant

gr~dually

An

comes to realize the difference between himself

and the other and perceives that some things belong to him and
other things to the environment.

At the same time he is forming

a concept of himself in relation to the things he comes in contact with, and he evaluates these relationships as good or bad.
Rogers considers it very important that values are not only the
~esult

~rom
~ad
~lap

of direct experience but are also taken over (introjected)

other people and perceived in a distorted manner,
been experienced directly.

~

if

they

For example, a child may like to

his baby brother but, upon being told by mother that it is

"good" to like baby brother, he may come to believe that he does
~ot
~o.

really want to hurt him in spite of a very real desire to do
Out of these two sources--the direct experience of the indi-

~idual

and the distorted symbolization of sensory reactions

!resulting in the intrOjection of values as if they were directly
~xperienced--the

structure of the self develops.

Turning now to the dynamics of personality we find that

9Ibid ., p. 223; Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy • • • ,
pp. 498-"5'm.
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is explained primarily in terms of actualization.

~ehavior

In

pis earliest book on his illethod of therapy (1942) Rogers recog-

v

IOizes 'the natural drive within every organism to actualize,
naintain, and enhance itself when he refers to "the impulses
toward growth and normality which appear in every indiVidUal,.;10
every person there are IIpositive impulses "vhich make for
growth. ltll Belief in the individual drive Goward growth, health,

.Il

and adjustment is reiterated and elaborated in Rogers' later
writings.

In his second book on client-centered therapy, he

of a single unifying teleological drive: " • • • one of the

~peaks

basic characteristics of organw life is its tendency toward
~otal, organized, goal-directed responses. ul2 His conviction
~ost

ulliversality of this drive constantly developed as he

~boutl:;he

~aw

client

aft~r

client achieve a more integrated life; and in

p,is latest book (1961) he repeats his belief, stated in an
~arlier

article, that all psychotherapy--and, indeed, all con-

~tructive activity13_-ultimately depends upon man's tendency to
~ctualize
~xtend,

himself, to become his potentialities, to expand,

develop, mature:

Gradually my exp8rience has forced me to conclude that the
individual has within himself the capacity and the tendency,
10Rogers, Counseling and Psyohotherapy, p. 201.

-

llIbid. t p. 35.
12Rogers, Client-Oentered Therapy • •• , pp. 486-87.
l3Rogers, On Becoming a Person • • _, pp. 350-51.
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latent if not evident, to move forward toward maturity • • • •
Whether one calls it a gr01.~th tendency, a drive toward selfactualization, or a forward-moving directional tendency, it
is the mainspring of life, and is, in the la8t analysis, the
tendency upon which all psychotherapy depends. It is the
urge which is evident in all organiC and human life--to
expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature--the tendency to express and activate all the capacities of the
organism, to the extef4 that such activation enhances the
organism or the self.
It is essential to realize that this process of actualization is a unifying and holistic concept in Rogers' theory.

The

organism reacts as an organized whole to its experience, and all
psychological and physiological needs are considered partial
aspects of this one

funda~ental

need for actualization.

Rogers

insists that man's activity cannot be understood by analysing out
segments of the total man and studying these independently of the
rest, for each individual segment is closely interdependent with
all of the others:
The outstanding fact which must be taken into account is that
the organism is at all times a total organized system, in
which attraction of any part may produce changes in any other
part. Our study of such pare phenomena must start from this
central fact of consistent, goal-directed organiza~on.15
By

insistir~

on this view Rogers is careful to avoid a homunculus

theory by which behavior would be organized and directed by some
little genie pulling levers at a control panel within the individual.

It is ouly the organism as a whole which acts.

The

14Ibid ., p. 35; cf. p. 285.

-

15Rogers, qlient-Centered TheraPl • •• , pp. 486-87.
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organism's perception of experience.

From a psychological stand-

point it is the perception of reality, and not necessarily reality itself, that is crucial in determining behavior.

As far as

the psychologist gua psychologist is concerned an organism's
perception of reality

1!

reality: flit is the perception ot the

environment which constitutes the enVironment, regardless as to
how this relates to some 'real' reality which we may philosophically postulate.u 21 Each individual lives in his own subjective
world in which reality is constituted by his unique perceptual
field, and behavior is appropriate to these perceptions. 22 For
example, two men driving at night on a western road may see an
object suddenly loom up in the road before them.

The first man

sees a large rock and swerves his car in fright; the second, a
Dative of the area, sees a tumbleweed and reacts with nonchalance.

Or a son and a daughter may hc!ve very different percep-

tions of a parent and consequently behave quite differently when
faced with the same situation.
Because behavior follows perception, Rogers is careful to
stress that the present is of primary importance in regard to
and their fulfillment--goals affect the organism at the

~eeds
~oment

~rom

of its action.

The past and the future cannot be divorced

the present; although theorganism comes out of the past and
21Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • •

~.

222.

It

• t

in Koch (ed.),

22Rogers, Client-Centered Thera£l • • • , pp. 484-86.
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is directed toward the future, it is living in the present.

This

is not to deny that past experience can influence present behavior, but motivation of a given action is caused by a present
need:
It should aleo bementl.oned that in this concept of m.otivation all the effective elements exist in the present.
Behavior is not "caused" by something which occurred in the
past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones
which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it
is true that past experienoe has certainly served to modify
the meaning which will be perceived in present experien~e.,
yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need. ,
Such is Rogers' general explanation of the actualization
of the organism.

However, it is important to realize that this

theory of actualization is modified and complicated in Rogers'
explanation of the human organism in particular.
First of all it should be pOinted out that although Rogers
discusses actualization, even on the human level, basically in
terms of tension-reduction, he does qualify his description by
stating that the human actualizing tendency includes concepts of
motivation which go beyond need-reduction:
It might also be mentioned that such concepts of motivation as are termed need-reduction, tension-reduction, drivereduction, are included in this concept (the actualizing
tendency). It also includes, however, the growth motivations
which appear to go beyond these terms: the seeking of pleasurable tensions, the tendency to be creative. the tendency
to learn painfully to w~lk when crawling would meet the same
needs more comfortably.24

23~., p. 492.
24-Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • •

p. 196.

• t

"

in Koch (ad.).
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Secondly, in the human organism, the factor of the development of the self is added to the general actualizing tendency.
Following the development of the

self-struct~re,

the tendency of

the organism toward actualization expressesitself in self-actualization, in maintaining and enhancing the self-structure.

If

the structure of the self is basically congruent with the total
experience of the organism, the actualizing tendency will remain
relatively unified.

However, if this is not the case, the organ-

ism will try to behave in ways which are consistent with the self
so that the self-structure will not be threatened. 25
Defenses against threats to the self-structure are built
up by refusing to admit these threats into consciousness.

Per-

ception therefore is selective, and the primary criterion for
selection is whether the experience appears consistent with onets
self-structure at the moment.
the~

It is this that determines whether

organism will symbolize its experience so that it becomes

conscious, ignore the experience as having no pertinent relationship to the self, or deny or distort symbolization as inconsistent with the self. 26
Behavior may, however, be brought about by organic experiences and needs which are in conflict with the self-structure.
But such behavior which deviates from the self-concept is often

25~., pp. 196-97, 203.
26Rogers, Client-Centered TherapY ••
pp 503-507;
Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • •• ,Ii in toch t:d.): p. 227.
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not accepted as really belongin3 to the individual--flI wasn't
myself when I (ii d that."

Sucb inconsistency between the retual

experience of the organism and the dist;ortion or denial of i. t in
order to maintain the self-structure is the basis for psychological maladjustment.
Why, though, does the conflict between experience a.nd.
self-structure occur?

Why is the individu:?l not open to h:is

experience at all times, as the infant is?
The fundamental reason hinges on the fact that there is a
universal need for p~sitive regard. 27 This term signifies such
attitudes as warmth, liking. respect, sympathy.
term Eoeitive

re5ar~

Rogers uses the

in the 1953 description of his theory rather

than the term acceptance because of the misleading connotations
be bas found the latter term to have.

The need for positive

regard from others develops as the awareness of self develops and
is so compelling that it may take precedence over the individual's personal organismic valuing process.

The key concept of

unconditional positive regard means that I perceive another's
self-experiences (or another person perceives mine) in such a way
that no self-exI,erience is considered :nora or less worthy of
positive regard than

e~

other.

It means considering the other

deeply worthy of respect. valuing his inherent worth as a person
even though I cannot equally value all of his actions, as a
27Rogers, "A Theory of rliherapy • • • , II in Koch (ed.),
pp. 208, 223.
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father would love his son while recognizing that some of the
son's acts are more deserving of praise than others.
there is a distinction here between

lI

(Note that

e xperience" and "overt

action. It)

Accepting tbe other in this sense means "prizing" the
other--to use Dewey's term 28 __ or "confirming the otber"--to use
Martin Buber's phrase 29_-as he is and in his potentialities.
The nee1 for self-regard is related to the need for positive regard from others. 30 The term denotes tbe satisfaction
wbich has become associated with personal self-experiences independently of the positive regard received from others in interpersonal situations.

This positive attitude toward self is thus

no longer directly dependent on the attitudes of others.

Uncon-

ditional self-regard is had when the individual perceives all of
his self-experiences as equally worthy

~

positive regard.

Opposed to unconditional positive regard is a condition

~~th.3l
worth

2!

The self-structure is characterized by a condition of

~hen

self-experiences are avoided or sought solely because

the individual considers them as less or more worthy of
28Quoted in Rogers,
Koch (ad.), p. 208.

I' A

Theory of Therapy • • ., It in

29 Carl R. Rogers and Martin Buber, !tDialogue between
Martin Buber and Carl Rogers" (unpublished dialogue which took
place at Ann Arbor, Michi6~n, April 18, 1957), p. 21. Referred
to by Rogers in On Becoming a Person • •• , p. 55.

30Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • • • ," in
pp. 209, 224.

-

31 Ibid ., pp. 209-10, 224-26.

~och

(e1.),
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given the proper conditions it will be released and manifest
itself. 33 If the person who is incongruent--tha tis, who does
not revise his self-concept to make it consistent with the actual
experience of the organism, accurately symbolized--finds himself
in a nonthreatening interpersonal relationship in which the other
person is congruent in the relationship, and experiences unconditional positive regard toward and empathic understanding of the
threatened individual, and if the threatened individual perceives
at least to a minimal degree this unconditional positive regard
and empathic understanding which the other hasfor him, then the
individual is able to explore the unconscious experiences that he
has before been unwilling to face and bring these experiences
into awareness. 34 If he knows that another can accept him, then
he is capable of accepting himself. He then gradually acquires
an internal locus 2! evaluation35 whereby the criterion of the
~aluing

process is his own actualizing process rather than exter-

nal values which are not personally meaningful to him.

Rogers

suggests that such acceptance may be the strongest factor of
change in a person. 36
33Rogers, On BecomiES a Person • •
34Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • •
pp. 213, 230-31.

., p.

35 •

., ,. in Koch (ed.),

35 Ibid • , p. 210; Rogers, On Becomi!!£i a Person • •
pp. 1l9-2r.-

.,

36Rogers and Buber, IIDialogue between Martin Buber and
Carl Rogers," p. 22.
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Although in his discussion of this Rogers is primarily
speaking of people who are incongruent enough to need psychotherapeutic help, he believes that because there is no man who is
always completely congruent the theory could be extended beyond
the psychotherapeutic situation to all interpersonal relationships.37
37Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy • •• ," in Koch (ed.),
pp. 235-44; Rogers, On Becoming a Person • •• , pp. 40, 178.

CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF MAN
There are three basic models according to which a theory
of personality can be constructed.
as a physical machine, lacking

a~

First, man can be looked upon
teleological principle and

consequently wholly explainable in mechanistic terms accoreing to
the laws governing the physical sciences.

Second, the theorist

can look upon the human person as a biological organism, thereby
admitting a teleological prinCiple in man but seeing man as
adequately explainable according to the laws of biology_

The

third possibility is to go further and construct a theory of
personality in the belief that man is essentially different from
other biological organisms.
~odification

Such a theory allows for a unique

of the general teleological drive which motivates

every organism in that at the human level this drive is controlled by the human organismts free volitional choices as to
just what his particular actualization will consist in.
What is the model of man, the conception of man's nature,
according to which Rogers has constructed his theory of personality?
First of all, it is clear that Rogers believes that man
does have a nature.

The term does not seem to be a particularly

27
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welcome one in psychological circles because of its philosophical
implications; and Rogers himself suggests that the term nature
may not be a happy choice for the concept it represents,l perhaps
not because it is philosophical but because of its medieval flavor.

But Rogers does explicitly sta.te his belief that man has a

nature which is common to his species.

He approaches the ques-

tion from the point of view of the animal kingdom in general,
pointing out that each animal has a basic substratum of attri~utes

characteristic of its species, and that therefore each

animal has a basic nature.

No amount of training will make a

lion out of a mouse, or vice-versa: "I do not discover man to be,
in his basic nature, completely

~Jithout

a nature, a tabula !:!!!

on which anything may be written, nor malleable putty which can
!'be shaped into .!!!Z form.,,2
Four main characteristics of man may be found in Rogers'
writings: man's dynamic nature is essentially positive, tends
toward social behavior, is free, and is unique.

These will be

examined in turn.
First, Rogers finds that man is essentially good.

Man

has I'a compelling necessity • • • to search for and become himself,u3 and the directional tendency of the organism toward
lRogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Ivlartin Buber and Carl
Rogers," p. 18.
2Rogers, itA Note on the Nature of Man," 200.
3Carl R. Rogers, Becomi~ a Person (Oberlin College Nellie
Heldt Lecture Series; reprinte by the Hogg Foundation for Mental
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wholesome, constructive growth is themost profound truth4 and
the most impressive fact 5 that one discovers about man.

Rogers

has built his psychotherapeutic method upon basic confidence in
this essentially constructive nature of the human organism6 and
he constaIltly reiterates his belief throughout his various writings.
In his first bock on the non-directive method of psychotherapy, Rogers states that positive impulses toward growth are
among the most certain and predictable aspects of the whole
psychothera.peutic process.?

He remarks in his next book that the

forward-moving forces of life underlie the entire process of
functioning and change. 8 In 1961 he stresses that:
It has been ~ experience that persons have a brsicalll
2QsItIve-dIrection. • •• ~words whicn-Y bel eve are most
truly descriptive are words such as positive, constructi.ve,
moving toward. self-actualization, growing toward maturity,
Hygiene; Austin: University of Texas, 1956), p. 12.
40arl R. Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual:
The Capacity for Becoming Fully Functioning" (unpublished paper
dated November 15, 1961, prepared as one chapter of a proposed
volume on The Conception £t!!a, ed. Arthur Burton), p. 6.
5Rogers, "The Actualizing Tendency in Relation to
'Motives' and to Consciousness," p. 5.
6 Carl R. Rogers and Rosalind F. Dymond (eds.), FsychotheraEY and Personality Chanse (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,

'19$4) t

p.

$.

?Roeers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, pp. 39, 209.
8Rogers, Client-Centered 'I'herapy • • • t p. 195.
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growing toward socialization. 9
And in a 1963 article. Rogers reviews his belief in this tendency
and illustrates it with examples from the biological and psychological sciences. lO
This positive-directedness of man is discussed at length
in Rogers' article, itA Note on the Nature of Man.
raises the question

of~il.

II

Rere Rogers

If the forces at the core of man

are released, a Freudian would ask, who is to control man?
Rogers' answer is that there need be no control except by the
in(li vidual himself.
lion.

He makes his point by comparing man with the

The lion has a reputation of being a ravening beast; but,

upon examination, we find that the lion does not kill for the
sake of killing but only when he is hungry or threatened.

We

find that in his puppyhood the lion is completely selfish and
self-centered but that as he matures he shows a cooperativeness
in the hunt.

v':e

discover that lions satisfy their sexual needs

but that they do not participate in lustful orgies, and that they
protect and seem to enjoy their young.

In sum, we find that the

lion is basically a constructive and trust'liorthy member of the
species Felis l!2 and that his behavior enhances both himself and
the species; it would be foolish to say that releasing the ltlionness fl of the lion would be to release an animal impelled by
9RogerS, On Becoming a Persop • •• , pp. 26-27_
10Rogers, liThe Actualizing Tendency in Relation to
'Motives' and to Consciousness, " pp. 1-8.
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insatiable 'lusts, uncontrollable aggreGsions an:1 innate tendencies of destructiveness. ll

In turning to tbe Qature of mB.n Rogers states that :llan too
is a basically trustworthy member of the species.

He says that

I find that man, like the lion, has a nature. My experience
isl:ihat he is a basi0ally trustworthy member of the human
species, whose deepest characteristics tend toward development, differentiation, cooperative relationships; whose life
tends fundamentally to move from dependence to independence;
whose impulses tend naturally to harmonize into a complex
and changing pattern of self-regulation; whose total character is such as to tend t;c fL'eserve and enhance himself and
his species, and perhaps to move it toward its further evolution. In my ex-perience t to discover that an. individual is
truly and deeply a unique member of the human species is not
a discovery t~ excite horror. Rather I am inclined to
believe that fully to be a human being is to enter into the
complex process of being one of the most widely sensitive,
responsive, creative. and adaptive creatures on this
planet. 12
Many critics have objected., however, that Eogers overstresses this notion of mants basic inherent goodness.

Walker

compares him to Rousseau, a.fter first comparing Freud with
Augustine:
• • • Carl Rogers, in the same cense, is the successor to
Rousseau. Recall that Rousseau began his classic presentations in Emile with the observation that every man comes from
the hand of hIs Maker a perfect being. This pristine splendor is corrupted, said Rousseau, by an imperfect society.
In his counseling theory Garl Rogers seems to have subtly
refurbished the conception of man as basically good. Rogers
comes close to the assumption of a "great golden beast" which
slumbers beneath the surface of neurotic man with his fatade
llRogers, "A Note on the Nature of Man," 200-201.
12 Ibid ., 201.
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of tensions, symptoms, and antagonism. l3
Menne makes the same comparison,l4 as do Perry and Estes, who
feel that Rogers' stress on innate growth tendencies place him in
a line beginning with Comenius and extending up through Rousseau,
Pestalozzi, Herbart, Fichte,
, Froebel, and John Dewey.15 Nosal,
commenting on Walker's article, agrees that Rogers overemphasizes
goodness in not stressing that man's behavior goes in different
directions. 16 Vanderveldt and Odenwald, criticizing Rogers from
a theological standpoint, believe that he neglects the evil
toward which man tends because of original sin. l ? Ellis, writing
in 1948, counters Rogers' statement that psychotherapeutic experience leads to Ita high degree of respect for the ego-integrative
forces residing within each individual,,18 by saying that "the
nondirective school of therapy does not seem, anywhere, to recognize the power of or have any respect for the

ego-~integrative

~--------------------------------------'-------------------------I

l3Dona1d E. Walker, "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man,"
Journal of Counseling PsycholoErt III (1956), 89.

l4Raymond Menne, The Theory ot Personality of Carl Rogers
(Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum "Angellcum," i96i', p. 26.
15Wi11iam H. Perry and stanley G. Estes, "The Collaboration of Client and Counselor,lt Psyohothera}1l, Theory and
Research, ed. O. H. Mowrer (New YOrk: Ronald Press, 19;;), p. 96.
l6w• S. Nosal, "Letter to the Editor," Journal of Counseling Psychology, III (1956), 301.
17J • H. Vanderveldt and Robert P. Odenwald, P!lcbiatr~
and Catholicism (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 19575; p. 101.
18Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality," American PSlchologist, II (1947), 361.
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forces which either reside within certain individuals or are
forced on them from without. ,,19

..

Nuttin, although looking with

favor on Rogers' stress upon the sound constructive forces of
growth which exist in man, believes that Rogers' self-actualization theory follows a simple one-track direction and fails to
recognize the conflict within man. 20
However, prescinding from the theological criticism, whic
is hardly his concern, Rogers certainly does not believe that ma
necessarily achieves the self-actualization of which he is capable.

His entire life as a psychotherapist has been spent in

helping people who have not developed properly according to thei
potentialities.

He recognizes that both external and internal

factors can affect an individual's strength and capacity to alte
his life:
Such elements as the constitutional stability, the heredita
background, the physical and mental equipment of the individual, enter into such an evaluation [of the strength or capacity of the individual to take action altering his life
courseJ. The type of social experience, too, has had its
molding effect, and the emotional components of the family
situation are especially important in judging the basic
assets of the yourger person. The economic, cultural, and
educational factors, both positive or negative, which have
entered into the experience of this person are also
important. 21
19A1bert Ellis, "A Cri ti~ue of the 'rheoretical Contributions of Non-Directive Therapy, JgUrnal gf Clinical Psychology,
IV (1948). 251.
20Joseph Nuttin. PFchoanal;rsla and PeasgnalifY: A ._-----Pynamic Theory g{ Ng~ll ,'§9nal1tz, trans. eorge a
~iro
York: Sheed and Ward, 1953 , pp. 100-101.
~
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It is true, however, that

~ogers

does lay heavy emphasis

on the inherent drive toward sel!-actualization--so heavy, in
fact, that he actually refers to this drive as invariant. 22 But
he is careful to qualify this by saying, only under certain conditions.

These conditions, exemplified in the optimum counseling

situation, basically constitute an interpersonal relationship of
IUnconditional positive regard and empath:b understanding wherein
~he

person realizes this regard and understanding.

~ned

If a threat-

person finds that another can accept him, then he is able to
himself and move in the direction of growth.

~ccept

Menne sug-

gests that Rogers' realizati on of the importance of this relationship, in which the person comes to appreciate his own value
and consequently is incited to love others and to effect his own
self-actualization, "COUld well be the basic and positive aspect
of Rogers· non-directive therapy.,,23
The process of human actualization, therefore, is by no
~eans

automatic; on the contrary it is a slow and painful pro-

pess. 24

But given the choice between forward-moving or regres-

sive behavior, the tendency toward growth will operate.

Writing

1n 1948, Rogers remarks that he has yet to find the individual
who, when he examines his situation deeply and feels that he
22Rogers, On Becoming & Farsoi • t ' t pp. 34-35; Ro§ers
and Buber, ~'Dialogue between Martin uber and Carl Rogers,
p. 22.

23 Menne t p. 54.
24Rogere, Clien~-Centered Therapy. ,

It

p. 490.

r
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perceives it clearly, deliberately chooses dependence. -"ihen the
elements are clearly perceived, the balance seems invariably in
the direction of growth.25
But Rogers is not blind to the outright evil of whXh man
is capable.

He denies that he has a Pollyanna view of human

nature and says that he is well aware that out of defensiveness
and fear man can be "incredibly cruel, horribly destructive,
immature, regressive, anti-social, hurtful.»26

And in replying

to Walker, Rogers disavows any direct influence from Rousseau and
~oints

out that he, unlike Rousseau, does not view man as an

essentially perfect being warped and corrupted by involvement
raith society.27
The primary question, then, in Rogers· eyes is, which of
the two directions in which man can and does move--positive and
negative--is predominant or more basic?
the former.

Rogers clearly opts for

He admits the obvious fact that man does have the

power and capacity for tremendous destruction, but he finds that
at core man has an overpowering thrust for growth if the

25Ro~ers, "Divergent Trends in Methods of ImprOVing
Adjustment, 218. Cf. Rogers, On Becoming a Perion , , .,
pp. 90-91.
26 Ro~ers, On Bec8ming a Pe~on , • _, p. 27. Cf., Carl
R. Rogers, "Concludingomment to ernard M. Loomer, Walter M.
Horton, and Hans Hofmann, 'Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers: A
~iscussion,t" PfI,§torat Psycholop;r;, IX (1958),27-28.
27Rogers, HA Note on the Nature of Man,1I 199-200.
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opportunity is provided. 28

To say that man is capable of evil,
therefore, is not to say that man is evil. 29 In a discussion

~ith

Martin

~ub.r,

Rogers refers to the fact that his psycho-

therapeutic experience has taught him that the elinician need not
supply the motivation toward positive, constructive actualization, for that already exists in the individual and indeed is
~hat

is most basic to the individual.

~robably

Rogers observes that he is

willing to place a greater trust in the process of

actualization than is Buber, who does not seem to believe that
the positive direction in man is more fundamental; rather Buber
~elieves
~nd

that there is a basic positive-negative polarity in man

that man is equally capable of moving in either direction

since both the positive and negative poles are equally fundamental. 30
In summary, then we see that Rogers considers man a
fundamentally positive-directed organism whose deepest tendencies
~re

toward growth.

Man 1s capable of great evil, yes, but at

the core man is constructive, is positive-orientated; the roots
of man are directed toward his self-actualization.
28Rogers, Client-Centered TherapY, t 't p. xi. This
point is strongly emphasized throughout Rogers writings: cf.,
e.g., "The Potential of the Human Individual • • • , II p. 22;
On Becoml~ a Person • • • , pp. 26-27, 91-92, 194-95.
29Rogers, On Becoming a Pe~son ••. t ' pp. 177-78, 325.
:;ORogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and
Carl R. Rogers,1I pp. 18-24.
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A second characteristic of man's nature found in Rogers'
writings is that man is basically a social being and that his
most characteristic behavior is social.

As has been pOinted out,

Rogers finds that man's basic nature tends toward cooperative
relationships with others.

The process of actualization does not

lead to egoistic behavior; rather self actualization involves not
only enhancement of self but also the enhancement of others. 3l
Rogers gives the abbreviated Case history of a Mrs.

0., a

woman who gradually discovered that the further she looked within
herself, the less she had to fear about herself and others;
and she gradually realized the possession of a self which was
deeply socialized.

Rogers asks whether we dare to generalize

from this type of experience and state that if we cut deeply
enough to our organismic nature we will find that man is a social
animal. He answers in the affirmative. 32 It is only when man is
false to himself and acts as less than man that he is to be
feared; when he is fully man his behavior, although not always
conforming to others, will always be socialized:
To put it another way, when man is less than fully man--whEn
he denies to awareness various aspects of his experience-then indeed we have all too often reason to fear him and his
behav:lor, as the present T'iorld 8i tuation teBti fiea. But when
~----------------------------------------------------------------I
31 Ct ., Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy •• _, pp. 150,
488; Rogers and Dymoni (eds,), Psichothe¥apy and Personality
Change, p. 4; Carl R. Rogers, Rev~ew of h$~ Self and the Dram~1

of HistorY, by Reinhold Niebuhr, Pastoral Psychology,

IX

17; Rogers, On Becoming! Person. , ., pp. 91-92, 192.
32Rogers, On BecQming a Person • • • , p. 103.
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he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when
awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is
most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his
behavior is constructive. It is not always conventional. It
will not always be conforming. It will be individualized.
Bub it will also be socialized.33
Dettering compares Rogers to John Dewey in seeing the
individual as tending toward social cohesiveness. 34 However, he
~elieves

that Rogers differs from Dewey in being extremely anti-

~uthoritarian

and that consequently, since neither counselor nor

teacher nor society is permitted to motivate this socialization,
~ogers

must count on some tendency within the individual to bring

~t

to fruition.

~e

an uncaused socializing tendency, the psychological laissez-

And this, in Dettering's eyes, would necessarily

~aire

counterpart to the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith's ecopomics. 35
Because of Rogers' stress on the need of a proper interpersonal relationship as the condition for constructive change to

~ake

place in a person, it is doubtful whether the flat statement

Ithat t1neither counselor nor teacher nor SOCiety is permitted to
motivate this socialization" is justified.
~uestion

~al

However, there is no

that Rogers does rely on a tendency within the individ-

toward self-actualization; this is the basic element of his

3'Ibid., pp. 105-106. Of. Rogers, 'tThe potential of the
Human Individual • • • ," p. 4.
34Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophical Idealism in Rogerian Psychology,lt Educational Theory, V (1955), 207.
35 Ib1d • t 212.

39
entire personality theory.

But whether he would agree that this

is necessarily an uncaused tendency is anoth: r question.

Because

Rogers considers the organism as dynamiC rather than static, he
would probably answer that the tendency itself is a causal factor.
We have noted that in Rogers' personality theory behavior
is ecplained basically in terms of actualization as the goaldirected attempt of the organism to satisfy its experienced
needs. although every behavior of the human organism does not
appear to be reducible to need-reduction in a strict sense. 36
The question arises as to whether Rogers goes beyond a purely
organismic model of man and recognizes at the human level a
unique modification of this natural drive of the

org~n1sm

in that

it is supplemented and dominated by an individual's free,
rational choices: does Rogers believe that man is free to determine his own life?
The answer is clearly, yes.

Man is free.

Frankl quotes Rogers as saying that he believed again in
human volition as a result of a student dissertation he directed
which made it clear that the determining factor in behavior is
the degree of self-understanding.3?

Behavior depends primarily

36supra, pp. 18, 20.
3?ViktorFrankl, "Psychotherapy and Philosophy. I! Philosophy TOd~, V (1961), 59-64. Frankl refers to: Carl R. Rogers,
"niscusson, II Existential Inquiries, I, No.2 (1960), 9. The
results of the dissertation referred to here and a later one
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not upon external conditions to which the individual is or has
been exposed but rather upon the individual's own awareness of
the reality of his s1 tuation, in the face of which he chooses his
course of action.
In his 1942 book Rogers recognizes the necessity of
admitting man's ability to choose more satisfying goals for bimself; the term creative

!!!ll

is employed to signify the kind of

choice which occurs when an individual is faced with two or more
ways of satisfying his needs. 38 Howie's objection that Rogers
~eans

two different things by creative !i!1--that the organism

[has an inherent drive for growth, and that action is done for the
sake of rewards--does not seem necessarily valid;39 it is possi~le

to answer that the will act is being considered from two dif-

~erent

points of view--on the one hand, from the point of view of

the agent, and on the other, from that of tihe value or reward.
In a 1946 article Rogers explicitly pOints out that
althougb behavior may be determined by the influences to which
the individual has been exposed, it may also be determined by the
~reative

and integrative insight of the organism itself;

~hich confirmed the first are published as: Carl R. Rogers, B. L.
lKell, and Helen McNeil, "The Role of Self-Understanding in the
~rediction of Behavior," Journal of Consulting Psychology, XII
(1948), 174-86.

38RogerS, counseling and PSlchothera£lt pp. 208-210.

39n • Howie, "Some Theoretical Implications of Rogers'
1N0n-Directive Therapy," Journal of General PSlcholoSl. XIIL
(1950), 239-40.
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spontaneous forces of volitional control exist within the individual.

This is a very important statement in reference to

Rogers' philosophy and deserves quoting in full:
The clinical experience could be summarized by saying
that the behavior of the human organism may be determined by
the influences to which it has been exposed, but it fay also
£! determined ~~ the creative and integrative-rnsTgh of the
organism itsel?; ~is ab!lity-or the person to discover new
meaning in the forces which impinge upon him and in the past
experiences which have been controlling him, and the ability
to alter consciously his behavior in the light of this new
meaning, bas a profound significance for our thinking which
has not been fully realized. We need to revise the philosophical basis of our work to a point where it can ,admit that
forces exist within the individual which can exercise a spontaneous and significant influence upon behavior which is not
predictable through knowledge of prIor influences and conditionings. The forces released through a catalytic process of
therapy are not adequately accounted for Vy a knowledge of
the individual's previous conditionings, but only if we grant
the presence of a spontaneous force within the organism which
has the capacity of integration and redirection. This capacity for volitional control is a force which we must take
into account in any psychological' equation. 40
Nuttin and Menne both refer to this passage as evidence
that Rogers' theory of personality is an advance over biological

~heories.4l
This stress on freedom is
~ays

p~obably

one reason why snyder

that Rogers' non-directive type, of psychotherapy is
40Rogers, "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered
422.

~herapy,rt

41Nuttin, pp. 102-103; Menne, p. 16. Menne also refers
Ito later writings of Rogers as evidence of the sue point: "Some
pirections and End points in Therapy," Ps chotherapY Theory and
~esearc~ed. O. H. Mowrer (New York: Rona d Press, 1 5;),
pp. :;0,;7; "The Concept of the Fully-Functioning Person" (unpub~ished peper; ChiCago: University of Chicago Counseling Center,
~953), esp. pp. 20-22; "Persons or science? A Philosophical Ques~ion,lI American Psychologist, X (1955), 268.

t
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philosophically rooted in idealism (following Kant) r'ather than
in logical positivism (following Looke), which Snyder considers
the philosophical foundation of directive psychotherapy.42

This

would be the same distinction Allport makes when he writes that a
sychology which considers man as passive is rooted i:.1l Locke,
whereas one which considers mall as active looks to Le.ibnitz and,
subsequently, to Kant. 43 Rogers beliet in the spontaneity of
the will is also one reason why nettering considers R,ogers an
idealism .. 44
b~te

The fact that Rogers recognizes free will, the

nOire

American psychology, clearly puts him at variance with the
ainstream of traditional psychology; but he cannot hlalp conclud,

'ng

that the traditional philosophical background of mechanistic
i

eterminism is inadequate for handling the phenomena ()f exper'ential freedom--the capacity of the individual to reorganize his
ttitudes and behavior in the direction determined by his own
nsight. 45
~----------------------------------------------------,.-----------4~1. U. snyder, Comment to "Carl Rogers and thE~ Nature of

an, It by Donald E.
(1956), 92.

~'lalkert

Journal of Counseling pSlcholof3;!' III

43Gordon ','V. Allport, Becomin5: Basic Consideratiione for a
cholo
of Personalit (New Haven: Yale Unlv. preen, 1955),
44nettering, 211-12.
45 Carl It. Rogers, "Dealing with Interpersonal conflict,"
astoral Fa cholo , III (1952), 18-20, 37-l 14. Of., Carl R.
ogers,
. earnJ.ng 0 Be Freen (unpublished paper given to a
session on "Conformi ty and Di versi ty" in the conferenee on tiMan
nd Civilization" sponsored by the University of Calitornia
chool of Medicine San Francisco . anu r 28
62
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In an article written in the early 1950's and included in
a revised form in his latest book, Rogers openly discusses the
seeming paradox that modern scientific psychology is faced with
regarding man's freedom.

On the one hand psychology, like any

other empirical sCience, is committed to a rigorous determinism
in which every event is necessarily determined by what precedes
it.

Yet, Rogers observes that it would be impossible for him to

deny that in the psychotherapeutic relationship he is faced with
a man who feels within himself the power of naked choice; such a
~an

is free--"to become himself or to hide behind a fagade; to
forward or to retrogress; to behave in ways which are

~ove

~estructive

of self and others, or in ways which are enhancing;

literally free to live or die, in both the physiological
land psychological meaning of those terms. It 46
~uite

Because

Rog~rs,

a prominent psychologist, is so insistent

on the fact of man's freedom, he is a likely target for determin~stically

orientated psychologists to aim at.

His most notable

and consistent adversary in this matter is Dr. B. F. Skinner,
~ith

whom Rogers has debated or discussed the quest;ion on va.rious

~ccasions.

In a study treating of the relationship between science
~nd

human behavior from a behavioristic sta.ndpoint, Skinner

~pholdg

environments.l determinism.

All activity is ultimately

1---.--_. _-_.- .------------------------46Rogers, On Becomins a Person • •• , p. 192.
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reducible to external behaVior, and all causality is external. 47
skinner believes that such a deterministic approach explains all
behavior which "common sense" would call free:
Man's vaunted creative powers • • • his capacity to choose
and our right to hold him responsible for his choice--none of
these is conspicuous in this new self-portrait (provided by
behavioral science]. Man, we once believed, was free to
express himself in art, music, and literature, to inquire
into nature, to seek salvation in his own way. He could
initiate action and make spontaneous and capricious changes
of course. Under the most extreme duress some sort of choice
remained to him. He could resist any effort to control him,
though it might cost him his life. But science insists that
action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual
and that caprice is only anoth~s name for behavior for which
we have not yet found a cause.
ffis basic contention is that
~ausality

scienc~ depe~ds

upon the strict

of behavior and that therefore to admit free will is,

~n

effect, to destroy the efficacy of science since a free event

~s

looked upon as an uncaused event.
The depth of Skinner's conviction that freedom must be

~enied

may be seen by the following.

~ogers

to address these remarks to him, implying that Skinner had

A paper by Skinner led

peither choice nor purpose in giving the paper at the meeting:
From what I understood Dr. Skinner to my, it is his understanding th~t though he might have thought he chose to come
to this meeting, might have thought he had a-purpose in
47B• F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York:
Macmillan, 19;3), pp. 35, 62-69, 149, 237, 317. Quoted in
Roberto zavalloni, Self-Determination: The Psychology of Personal
Freedom, trans. Virgilio Bias10l and Carroll Tageson (Chicago:
Forum Books, 1962), pp. 17-18.
48 B• F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men,"
scholar, XXV (Winter, 1955-56), 52-53. Quoted in
Rogers, on Becoming a Person • • • , p. 390.
~merican
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giving th~ speech, such thoughts are really illusory. He
actually made certain marks on paper and emitted certain
sounds here simply because his genetic makeup and his past
environment had operantly conditioned his behavior in such a
way that it was rewarding to make these sounds, and that he
as a person doesn't enter into this. In fact if I get his
thinking correctly, from his strictly scientific point of
view, he, as a person, doesn't exist. 4 9
True to his philosophy, Skinner accepted this characterization of
his presence at the meetingJ
Rogers himself does not deny that there is a real problem
in explaining freedom, for he agrees with Skinner that it is
necessary that science look upon all behavior as caused.

But he

accepts as a starting pOint the incontrovertible fact of man's
subjective experience of free choice:
If we choose to utilize our scientific knowledge to free
men, then it will demand that we live openly and frankly with
the great paradox of the behavioral sciences. We will recognize that behavior, when examined SCientifically, is surely
best understood as determined by prior causati on. This is
the great fact of science. But responsible personal chOice,
which is the most essential element in being a person, which
is the core experience in psychotherapy, which exists pri Q
to any scientific endeavor, is an equally prominent fact.' O
~nd

he disagrees with Skinner's explanation of what the causality

of science entails.

SCience, says Rogers, is not to be reified

-

!3.nd spelled with a ca.pi tal S as though it were a SUbsistent
being; rather science is knowledge which exists only in the mind
of the scientist and which is employed only for a purpose chosen
by the scientist.

In any scientific endeavor there 1s a prior

49 Rogers, "Learning to Be Free," p. 5.
50RogerS, On Becoming a Person • •• , p. 400.
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value choice on the part of the scientist concerning the object
of that endeavor, and this choice necessarily lies outside of the
scientific endeavor itself.

This applies to skinner as well as

to any other sCientist; he must decide what the goal of his
behavioral experiments is to be.
~e

A frequent answer to this might

that a continuing scientific endeavor will evolve its own

goals inasmuch as initial findings will alter the direction and
subsequent findings will alter them still further.

But even

here, Rogers points out, subjective personal choice enters in at
every point at which the direction changes.

SCience, in sum, is

not an inexorable juggernaut crushing the scientist but rather is
knowledge employed according to subjectively chosen goals. 51
Skinner refers to Rogers' explanation of how choice
~nters

into scientific work and answers that "choicelt can be

~xplained

~erely
~ore

by a behavioristic reinforcement theory; values are

reinforcers which make any behavior which produces them

likely to recur.

And such reinforcers are external to the

prganism; or, at least, no evidence can be given to satisfy

~kinner that there is a truly inner choice of values. 52
Rogers' disagreement with Skinner concerning the problem

IOf freedom does not mean, however, that Rogers is criticizing
~ttempts

to study man's behavior scientifically but only that he

51~., pp. 215-24, 384-402.
~ns

52Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concernthe Control of Human Behavior," SCience, CXXIV, No. 3231

(1956), 1065.
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is criticizing the philosophical presuppositions of scientists
like Skinner.

Rogers himself defends scientific procedure

against Reinhold Niebuhr's contention that free acts of man are
ot a valid area of scientific investigation.

Niebuhr believes

that science is over-stepping its legitimate bounds when it
attempts to predict future behavior on the basis of investigation
of past behavior.

Rogers believes that this is equivalent to

telling scientists that they should not search for order in the
ature of man or in man's outer behav.ior, and he does not believe
that sdientists will be very receptive to the admonition. 53
The frame'Nork of classical psychoanalysis is also inadefor seeing the totality of man, for it too reaches only the
aspect of man.

Rogers approves of Rollo May's state-

psychoanalysis was most helpful and most effective in
derstanding the Umwelt--man in his biological relationship to
he environment. his ttworld-around" but that it has not been
uccessful in providing an understanding of the Mitwelt--the
of man's relationship to his fellow men--and that
ts greatest lack has been on the level of the Eigenwelt--the
"own-world" of relationship to one's self. 54

The more subjective

personal the relationship, the greater the failure of a
Self and the Dramas of History,
Rogers and Skinner, "Some
of Human Behavior," 1060.

emporary

•
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purely external approach to explain it.
Rogers believes, then, that to obtain an adequate view of
man it is necessary to go beyond a mechanistic philosophy, beyond
an external approach to man, an(:

,~o

find a philosophy which will

bridge the gap between the determinism upon which science is
built and the self-determination or freedom which is the only
foundation upon which experience is explicable.
This search for a framework which will enable the entire
man to be grasped has led Rogers to existential psychology, an
approach to man which refuses to accept the prevalent modern view
that man is unfree, a mere product and pawn of his heredity,
~ulture.

and circumstances.

Here the central focus is always man

as a human person, man seen from a subjective Viewpoint, from the
"inside" rather than from an external frame of reference in which
he is objectified.

Here again we have the clear statement of one

of Rogers' fundamental convictions:
From the existential perspective. from within the phenomenological internal frame of reference. man does not simply have
the characteristics of a machine, he is not simply a being in
the grip of unconscious motives, he is a person in the process of creating himself. a person who creates meaning in
life, a person who embodies a dimension of subjective freedom. He is a figure who, though he may be alone in a vastly
complex universe, and though he may be part and parcel of
that universe and its destiny, is also able in his inner life
to transcend the material universe. who is able to live
dimensions of his life which are not fully or a.equately
contained in a description of his conditionings. or of his
unconscious.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Man has long felt himself to be but a puppet in life--molded
by economic forces, by unconscious forces, by environmental
forces. He has been enslaved by persons, by institutions, by
the theories of psychological science. But he is firmly

,.
49
setting forth a new declaration of independence. He is discarding the alibi~ of un!reedom. He is Choosiif himself,
endeavoring, in a most-aifficult and often trag c world, to
become nimself,--not a puppet, not a slave, not a machine,
out fiis own unique individual self. The view I have been
desvr ibing in psychology has room for this philosophy of
man. 55
In this framework, freedom is essentially an inner thing,
quite aside from the outward choice of alternatives which is
often thought to constitute freedom.

It is fundamentally an

attitude, the choice of one's attitude toward life and the discovery of meaning and responsibility from within oneself.

This

remains when everything else has been taken from a man, as is
~llustrated

by Frankl's description of his years in a Nazi conpentration camp.5 6 Regardless of whether a person has hundreds

of objective outer alternatives from which to choose or whether
~e has none, this freedom remains. 57
In the light of such thinking, Rogers proposes a tentative solution to the problem of freedom versus determinism: the
~reely-function1ng

person--that is, the person in whom there is

~undamental

congruence between the self-concept and experience--

~oluntarily

chooses and wills that which is also absolutely

determined by the factors of the existential situation; the individual chooses and assumes responsibility for bringing about the
55Rogers, ItToward a science of the Person, II pp. 3/+-35.
56Viktor 'E. Frankl, From Death Camp to E,xisb;r.t~i[.::tlism,
trans. I. Lasch (Eoston: Beacon Press, l~;t;), p. b;. Quoted in
Rogers t "Learning to Be Free t" p. ?
57Rogers, "Learning to BeF'ree t

"

pp.

7-8.
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destined events of his world.

This would mean that considered

from an external scientific viewpoint there are specific determining causes

for~erything

that man does, a view which necessi-

tates the denial of freedom; but looked at subjectively, man is
free to determine much of his life. 58 Freedom is thus saved, at
least from the standpoint of the subjective, and this is most
important in Rogers' eyes since he bal!_-.;es that the subjective
precedes the objective

fr~mework

in considering man.

The scien-

-

tiflc view Is an abstraction from the totality of man whereas the
subjective is more encompassing thanmientific knowledge. 59 This
solution, it may be repeated, seems to be a manifest paradox even
to Rogers; and he is not offering it as definitive.
Rogers therefore clearly maintains that man is free.
However, it should be noted that for Rogers this characteristic
of freedom does not distinguish man essentially from other organisms, as traditional philosophy maintains.

He has implied that

all needs are ultimately physiologically rooted,60 and he has
used the terms "sensory and visceral experiences" and "organic
experiences tl to refer to the totality of expe2ience. 61
Strictly speaking, what makes man different for Rogers
58 Ibid •

Cf., Rogers, On Becoming a Person • • • , p. 193.

59Rogers, "The Potential of the Human Individual • • • ,"
p. 21.

60nogers, Client-Centered Therapy. " ., pp. 491-92.
61 Cf ., Rogers, itA Theory of Therapy • • •

(ed.), p. 19?

,11 in Koch
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from other organisms is that man has the potentiality of awareness; it is upon this that rationality and freedom are founded.
But Rogers does not regard this as sufficient evidence that man
is different in kind from other organisms.

In a recent article

he states that awareness is, indeed, a unique characteristic of
~an

and one which, coupled with man's vocal equipment, makes him

~ar

superior to any other organism, however, he adds that this

~akes

man almost,

~

not quite, different in kind and not merely

in degree:

TO a greater degree than any other living organism, man
has the capacity to be aware of his functioning, to symbolize--whether in words, in images, or in other ways--that
which is going on within his experience, and that which has
gone on in the past. This has given him enormous power--to
think, to plan, to take a pathway symbolically and forsee
[siC] its consequences without taking the pathway in fact.
It, plus his vocal eqUipment, has also given him an enormous
range of personal expression, so much superior to that of any
other organism that it is almost a difference in kind, rather
than simply of degree. 62
It is a logical step from this to say, as Rogers does,
that viewed from the objective perspective it will probably be
increasingly possible to understand human behavior in terms of
laws similar to the laws of the natural SCiences, in which view
man would be but "a complex sequence of events no different in
kind from the complex chain of equations by which various chemical substances interact to form new substances or to release
energy-.u 6 ; Rogers believes, then, that behavior would be
62Rogers, liThe potential of the Human Individual •
p. 11.

6;Tbid ••

'0.

20.
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unpredictable only in f act, not in theory.

It instruments were

available to measure all of the stimuli affecting the organism
and it a giant mechanical computer were available to interpret
this data and to calculate the most economical vector ot response
for the organism, then behavior could be predicted.

But in a

concrete situation--and every concrete situation is different
from every other--there are so

ma~

stimuli exerting a causal

influence on the organism that allot the relevant data could not
be collected and interpreted before the organism itself makes its
own appraisal and performs the action.
~erson,
~ore

Behavior of the adjusted

therefore, will be dependable but not predictable.

The

congruent a person is, the less predietable is his behavior.

It is the maladjusted person who tends to be predictable, for his

~ehavlor falls into rigid patterns. 54
Rombauts believes that Rogers' theory is open to a charge
~f

reductionism because of Rogers' implication that the totality

human experience can be reduced to basic sensory and visceral
exper1enee. 65

~t

Menne takes issue with Rogers' application of this theory

ot freedom to his general theory ot interpersonal relations;
Menne comments that if man is truly free, behavior is never
64Rogers. ItThe Concept of the Fully-Functioning Perm n, rt
pp. 17-19.

65A. J. Rombauts, If De Opvatting van de Persoonlijkbeid in
net Oounseling-Slsteemvan Carl Rogers," Tijdschrift voer Philosophie, XXI (1959), 79-61. 95.

r
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invariant regardless of what conditions are present to motivate
change. 66
In summary, then, we may say tbat Rogers insists on the
fact of man's freedom; the basic experience of man cannot be
denied in this matter.

Rogers recognizes that such an admission

is not consistent with the presuppositions of modern science and
~e

offers a tentative solution to the problem by considering

freedom from two different points of view, the objective in which
freedom is denied, and the subjective in which freedom is admitted.

Rogers believes that consciousness, upon which freedom

depends, is unique to man; but he does not believe that this
characteristic essentially differentiates man from other organisms.
The fourth characteristic concerning man's nature that is
evident in Rogers' personality theory is an emphasis on the
uniqueness of each individual man. 67
~uent

Just as the natural conse-

of Rogers' stress on the goodness of man is his emphasis

~n

the social nature of man, so this characteristic of .uniqueness

~s

dependent upon his stress on man's freedom.

Theorists who

~eny

the freedom of man are prone to regard individuals as so

~any

examples of the species; if man is not free to direct his

self-fulfillment, all one need look for to explain an
66Menne, p. 56.

67Cf., e.g., Rogers, Becoming a Person, pp. 7, 21;

Rogers, On Becoming a Person • • • , pp. I?$, 178, 349-50.
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individualts behavior are the rigid patterns of behavior common
to the species.

As we have seen, Rogers encounters difficulty in

this matter because of his desire not to contradict the scientific viewpoint; but his primary insistence is on the freedom and
consequent uniqueness of each individual.
This characteristic is significant enough to deserve
particular mention because it too differentiates Rogers' theory
from the majority of other prevalent psychological theories of
personality that leading psychologists have proposed.

The impor-

tance of this characteristic will become evident in Chapter V.
where it will be seen that Rogers discusses values and the good
life in terms of the unique valuing process of each individual
person.

r

CHAFTER IV
TIiE

EPI~:)T"2MOLOf}ICAL

PROBLEM O.F OBJECTIVE REALITY

AS a psychologist Rogers is interested in the question
"what is reality?" primarily from the standpoint of psychology.
specifically clinical psyohology.

His conclusion, as we have

in discussing his theory of personality, is that as far

~entioned

as the psychotherapist is concerned an indlvldual·s perception of
is reality; the entire perceptual field of the individual
constitutes reality for him. and his behavior is appropriate to

~eallty

~ls perceptions. l
whether or not there is such a thing as "objective real-

lity" to which subjective perceptions may correspond is, to
~ogers'

mind, irrelevant as far as psychological purposes are

~oncerned.
~rate

However. it may be argued that it is invalid to sap-

psychology from philosophy in this matter.

~uestion

Certainly the

of whether an individual is in contact with what might

be called objective reality is important for a theory of personality, particularly in regard to the formulation of a theory of
values and an explanation of the good life.

And since Rogers

explicitly formulates a theory of personality to account tor his
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psychotherapeutic experiences and spends considerable time discussing values and the good life, it is necessary to determine
his underlying epistemology.
Rogers makes statements in an early article published in

1947 that could be interpreted to mean that he
reality beyond subjective perception.

is denying any

He suggests that behavior

is perhaps influenced only by an individual's perception of reality and not by any "real" reality behind this perce:ption: he
hypothesizes that "behavior is

~

directly influenced ££ deter-

mined

£l

only)

£l ~ perception.2! these elements.,,2 (It should be noted

organic

~ ~ultural

factors,

~

primarily (and perhaEs

that this statement seems to be more llcontra-psychoanalysis" than
strictly philosophical.

Rogers' pOint is that behavior mnot a

"given" resulting automatically from certain organic and cultural
conditions but that it is primarily the result of the values that
subjective behavior places upon them.)

Secondly, Rogers speaks

of self-satisfaction as the inJex of adjllstment and well-being,
thereby defining adjustment as an internal affair, dependent upon
an individual's perception of himself rathert;han upon an exterA

nal reality.;)
In a cudgel-swinging attack on this article, :i::llis commentis that if the concept of adjustment is entirely dependent
upon internal satisfaction, no type of person may! priori be
2Rogers, ItSome Observations on the Organizat.l.on of Personality., It ,62.
'Ibid. ___ 364.
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considered maladjusted; for most religious zealots, hatchet murderers, rapists, ps.1chopaths, and schizophrenics usually seem
quite content with their internal affairs.

This definition of

adjustment is seen as but the logical result of Rogerst first
statement about behavior perhaps being influenced only by perception.

Ellis claims the support of Northrop and other modern

philosophers in saying that an individual's perception of reality
is not divorced trom that reality but is intrinsically linked
('tepistemically correlated") with it.

He theretore believes that

Rogers' position is both philosophically-untenable and contradictory-'tif a client· s adjustment were onll influenced b;r his per-

-

~eption

of external events, rather than also b;r the external

~eality

of such events. he might just as well have a directive as

a non-directive therapist--or, indeed no therapist at all."4
Block and Thomas also objected to Rogerst saying that an
individual's judgment of himself is the index of his adjuatment. 5
[However the editor ot the magazine in which the Block and Thomas
article appeared pointed out that after this article was written,
but before its publication, Rogers published PsychotheraPl and
fersonality Cha~eG which includes the reporting by Rogers,
4Ellis, 252. Ellis cites F. S. c. Northrop, The Meetias
of East and west (New York: Macmillan, 1946).

5J • Block and H. Thomas, "Is Satisfaction with Sel£ a
Measure of AdJustment?" Journal of Abnormal and Social PSlchol211, L1 (1955), 254-59.
GRogers and Dymond (eds.), pSlahoth.ra~l and personalitl

Chang"e.
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Butler, and Haigh of the finding ot a high relationship between
self and ideal self descriptions in individuals recognized by
other means as defensive and repressive,? so Rogers himself had
oome to admit that a malad3usted person may be ver,r satistied
with himself, thus implying that there is a reality to which such
a person is not ad3usted.
But is this reality that lies beyond perception what can
be called

ob~ectiv.

be known a8 such?

reality in a philosophical sense, and can it
Two suppositions ot Rogers' epistemology are

relevant to a consideration of the.e questions.
First of all, Rogers implies that reality does not extend
beyond the s.nsible--"a~thing that exists can be measured. n8

It

is perhaps unfair to oonclude from this somewhat offhand remark
that Rogers detinite17 limits reality to the

:~nsible,

but at

least it might be said that he believes that man cannot have
knowledge transcending the sensible.
second. Rogers believes that it truth is to be known, if
reality is to be peroeived, then scienoe is

t~

best road to tol-

low'in achieving it, even in such a delicately intricate area as
that of human relat1onsh1pe. 9
What therefore is Rogers' conception ot science?
First, Rogers believes that true science does not limit
?BlOCk and Thomas, 254.
BRogers, On Beco.ias a Person • • • , p. 206.
9Rogers, Client-Centered Tn.rapT • • • , p. xi.

59
itselt. as is commonly thought, to one type of knowledge--objective knowledge--but rather makes use of all three of the ways of
knOwing that Rogers discovers in man.
In an article written in 1963, Rogers sta.tes that the
essence of all knowing is the construction of hypotheses aDd that
these hypotheses are checked in three different ways, constituting three different types of human knowing.

Subjective knowing

is knowledge from within a person's own internal trame d

refer-

enc., and the hypotheses are checked by using the ongoing flow of
~reoonceptual

experiencing as a referent.

For example. I wonder

"do I love her?Jt and realize that it is only by reference to the
~low

of feelings in me that I can begin to conceptualize an

answer.

Rogers admits that this t,ype of knowledge does not lead

to publicly validated knowledge; but he believes that it ls funp.amental to everyday living and i8 our most basiC way of knowing,
"a deeply rooted organismiC sensing. from which we form and
differentiate our oonscious symbolizations and conceptions_" lO
The second type of knowing is objective knowing.

Here the

hypotheses are based upon an external trame of reference and are
checked both by externally observable operations on the part of
the individual and by dependence upon a trusted reference group.
Rogers points out that this type of knowing can be concerned only
~ith

objects or with the objective aspects ot whatever is being

studied.

The third type is interpersonal or phenomenological

lORogerS t "Toward a Science of the Person,» p. 5.
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knowing, which is concerned primarily with the knowledge of human
beings and of higher organisms.

Here I "know" that you feel

hurt, that you have a strong desire to reach the top of your
protession, that you are concerned with thermo-nuclear war.
These hypotheses are checked by placing myself, as much as possi~le,

within your personal world of meanings, your phenomenologi-

cal field.

The criteria for this type of knowing are twofold:

either you yourself confirm my hypothesis about your internal
trame ot reterence by directly telling me, or else I check my
~othesi.
~our

by a kind ot consensual validation, inferring trom

actions that my hypothesiS about you is correct or having

other people mention to me the same tact that I have sensed about

~ou.ll
It is only as each ot these three ways ot knowing is used

in appropriate relationship to the other two that a satisfactory
science will develop.
~xplanation

AS

was mentioned in discussing Rogers'

of freedom, he believes that all science begins with

subjective knowledge, with a highly valued creative inner bJpoth~sis

~ence
~o

that is checked against the relevant aspects of one's experand which may then lead to a formal scientitic hypothesis

be objectively studied.

~nowledge
~bout

Further, the interpersonal type ot

must be used to arrive at richer and deeper insights

nature and human nature than any purely external approach
llIbid., pp. 2-13-

-
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~ould do. 12
Second. to consider the objective aspect of science in
~etail,

we find that science procedes by the construction of

theories and that the core of a theory is a set ot hypothetical
~ormulations
~an

which may be put to the test: Ifscientific advance

be made only as we have bypotheses which

tally tried, tested, and improved_»13
~esting

m~

be experimen-

The stress on objective

is essential, for only by this means can it be determined

.hather or not a theory is useful:
It has been felt that a theor.y, or a~ segment of a theory,
is useful only if it can be put to test. There has been a
sense of commitment to the objective testing of each significant aspect of our hypotheses, believing that the only way in
which knowledge can be separated from individual prejudice
and wishful thinking is through objective investigation.
To
be objective such investigation must be of the sort that
another investigator collecting the data in the same way and
performing the same operations upon it, will discover the 14
same or similar findings, and come to the eame conclusions.
~h.se
~e

~rs

hypotheses will lead to operational defi.nitions which mq

the basis of increasing predictability:

It • • •

research work-

can make specific pred.ictions in terms of operationally

~e.tinable constructs • • • • ,,15
~ncreasing

And besides this possibility of

the ability to predict events, the theory may aleo

12 Ibid., pp. 13-15.

-

13Rogers. Counseling and PSlchotherapy, p. 16.
14Rogers, On Becoming a Person • •• , pp. 244-45.

15 Ibid •• p. 246.

-
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~.ad to control over the events. 16 Further, the theory aims at
pon8istenoy and its propositions should adequately account for
all the phenomena,l? and it seeks to establish orderly relation~hip8 between the phenomena. 18 Finally, the constructs should

~v. generality.l9 We may piece these charaoteristics together,
~h.n,

.~

and

that Rogers would defia. a scientifie theory

.a

a

of bypothetical formulations characterized by verifiability

~.t

~nd g.nerali~,
~ntegrat.d

~or aDd

leading to operational definitions which are

in a consistent tramework tbat will adequately account

order the phenomena and m8.J" also lead to incleased pre-

~ictabl1ity

and oontrol.

The word BlRotbetieal in this definition does not mean
that the theory i8 an ! Erior! mental construct created out of
~hin

air apart from observed data but is rather built up by

~nduction

tram the perceived data.

Rogers insists that there

~!8

no need tor th.0rT until and unless there are phenomena to
explain"H 20 He will theretore say that those who, for example,
criticize client-centered tberapy for not proceeding from a
poherent theory ot personality have actually distorted the

16Ibid., p. 206.

-

l?aogera. Client-Centered TheraRl • • • , p. 482.
laRogera, On Beco.iEi a Person • • • , pp. 24-25; Rogers,
fA Theory of Therapy • • • ~ In loch
p. 188.

eea.,.

19Rogers, On Becomi!l a Person • • • , p. 246.

Pt .

20 Rogers. Client-Centered Tberap{ • • • , p. 15.

Rogers, "A Theory or Tnerapy • • • ,

in Koch (ed.), p. 189.

r
purpose of a theory. for the theory implicit in client-centered
therapy, as with any other theory, is one which has been built
up by induction.
Because a theory begins with induction and is primarily
intended to furnish an adequate tramework for all of the observed
phenomena, one is at first led to believe that Rogers assume. a
realistic epistemology.

This impression is further heightened

by the fact that Rogers explicitly states that the aim of science

is to objectively understand the data:
In approaching the complex phenomena of therapy with the
logic and methods of SCience, the aim is to work toward an
understandi!l of the phenomena. In science this means an
obJeotlve inow1tdge of events and of functional relationships
between events. 21
~e

also discusses the problem of checking objective scientific

~indings

with realit,y and states that by using different lines

of evidence the scientist can be sure that his linding has some

~eal relationship to tact. 22
However, this assumption is not true in the case of
~ogers.

He goes on to assert that no matter how profound the

scientific investigation, no absolute truth can be discovered by
it nor any underlying realit<y in regard to persons, relation-

ships, or the universe.

Science can only describe relationships

which have an increasingly high probability or occurrence but
which can neTer be known as completely certain since the factor
21RogerS,

-

pn Becoming a person • • • , pp. 205-206.

22 Ibid ., pp. 217-18.

of error necessarily enters into the picture to a greater or
lesser extent. 23 Although there may be objective truth, it can
!never be known:

TO put it more briefly, it appears to me that though there
be such a thing RA objective truth, I can never know it.
All I can know is that some statements appear to me subjectively to have the qualifications of objective truth. There
is no such thing as Scientific Knowledge; tbere are only
individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be
such knowledge. 24

m~

~urtber,

Rogers states that there is no sucb thing as a scienti-

J

~ic

-

methodology which gives infallible knowledge.

~oes

If a science

not limit itself to one mode of knowledge but rather inter-

all three, it will approximate the truth; but such approximations are not absolute certitude. 25

~eaves

In the light 0.£ these beliefs, then, it is logical that

Rogers should preface his latest article on the nS.ture of man
:with the sta.tement that although everyone has some describable
conception of the nature

or

man, no one can know this nature with

assurance. 26
Rogers believes that this view of science 1s as Valid for
psychology as it is for the physical sciences.

The pbysicist.

s~s

Rogers, bas become accustomed to the tact that he cannot

~och

23 Ibid ., p. 206; Rogers,
(ed.),"pp. 190-91.

ItA

Theory ot Therapy • • • , tt in

24Rogers, nA Theory of Therapy
p. 192.

if

..

.,,11 in Koch (ed.),

25Rogers, "Toward a Science of the person," p. 14.
26Rogers, ItThe potential of the Human Individual •
1),

1 ..

. ., "
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know "reality,'" as evidenced by the fact that space and motion
have no absolute meaning but are relative to tbe vantage point ot
the Observer;27

in like manner may it not be possible that the

quest for "reality"

m~

lems of personality?

be equally unsound in dealing with prob-

Perhaps a recognition that there are vari-

ous perceptual vantage points from which to view the person, one
of these being from within the consciousness of the person hiaself, will have to be substituted tor a hypothetical single reality.

Rogers believes that the evidence of lawfulness and inter-

nal order within each of these perceptual viewpoints pOints to
the correctness of his suggestion.

It is true that there is also

evidence of signifioant
and perhaps predictable relationships
i
between these ditf'erent perceptual systems; but this remains tar
from conclusive evidence that there is ! reality with which the
science ot personality deals,28 particularly in view of the tact
tha.t the perceptual tlmap" according to which each of us lives is
never realit.1 itselr. 29
easily understandable
check !l olinical

why

In the light of this assumption, it is
endeavored to
-reality,
without !!!!

Rogers states;

ex~erience ~

It

I have

~ ~

philosophical puzzlement !! ~ which '~ealitl'

II !.2!!

valid. ,,30

27Rogers refers the reader to Lincoln Barnett, The Universe and Dr. EillStein (New York: Wm. Sloane AsS., Inc., 1948).
28Rogers and Dymond (eds.), PsyobotheraEl and Persona1itl
Change, pp. 432-33.
29Rogers, Client-Centered TheraPl " •• , p. 485.

30Rogers, On Becomi!6 a Person • • • , p. 197.
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It is evident, therefore, that Rogers does not believe
tbat man can I' each objective truth in the traditional .nae of
the term, that is, that the actual

intelli~ibility

is grasped and spoken by the knowing subject.

of an object

For science, the

approach most likely to discover an objective truth, does not
achieve this end.

But it should be pointed out at the same time

that although Rogers denies that man is able to know objective
truth, he does not deny that an objective truth may exist.

What-

)

ever is known is not and cannot be known as objective reality
trom my subjective standpoint, but the possibility ot such a
reality cannot be categorically denied.
In spite of Rogers' scientific theories, however, he does
not deny that for purposes of l>ractical living men do reach a
common practica.l truth. 31 This ls explained by the fact that

\ife

are constantly checking our perceptions (which, it will be

recalled, constitute reality from a psychological standpoint)
against one another, or combining them, and checking them against
those of other men so that they become myra reliable guides to
Itreali ty.

It

So al though 'Rogers t main stress is upon the realitY'

o! personal perceptions, he will say that considered in a SOCial
context reality consists ot perceptions which have a high degree

or

commonality among various individuals.

objective truth, however.

This is still not an

Rather than saying that most people

have a similar perception of this desk because it is real, Rogers
31Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy • • • , pp. 485-86.
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states the proposition the other way around: "This desk is 'real t
because most people in our culture would have a perception of it
which is very similar to

my

own."32

Thus Rogers clearly implies a dichotomy between two different worlds--the experiential world in which a practical truth
1s reached, based upon the commonality of experience;

and

the

intelligible. yet unknowable, world of the "really real" that

-

may lie beyond perception: "strictly speaking I do not know that

the rock is hard, even though I m«1 be very sure that I experience it as hard if I fall down on it_,,33

Rogers recognizes that

a8 a man living in the world, surrounded by and interdependent on
the obvious reality of the world, he is living as though he were
in contact with reality.

But following the positivistic training

he has received he feels forced to a dmit that the scientific
investigator does not really pierce through the layer of subjective perception to the bard core of what may be considered the
really real; as a coldly logical scientist who accepts the principles of science as he has learned them aDd as he has applied
them, Rogers must believe that there is something not quite
legitimate about the common sense world in which he lives, the
world of illusion which entices man into believing that the real
may

be known.
Having examined Rogers' own position, we are now able to

32 Ibid ., p. 485.

33RogerSt On Becomiag a Person • • • , p.

~l.

r
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consider the major criticism to whioh bis position has been subjected.
Menne ascribes to Rogers tbe belief that reality is
limited to what is present in a person's mind and therefore to
the purely subjective:
Rogers • • • has olearly defined just what he does mean by
realit.7. For him, reality is limited not only to tbat portion ot existing things whioh bave a relation to, or effect
on. a person. but these things only insofar as they are
"potentially available to awareness .. " This very definitel,..
limits real1t.1 to the subjective. That iS t tbipgs are real
insotar as they are preseni ti a person's mind.,4
HoweVer, the statements of Rogers that Menne refers to in support of his contention are taken from psychological contexts in
which Rogers is developing his theory that all the pw,rchologist
need be concerned with is the individual's perception of realit,..35

But we have seen that Rogers does not denT the existence

ot objeotive reality from a philosophioal standpoint, so Mennets
oriticism is unjustified.
The strongest objection to Rogers' epi.stemology has come
from Dettering.36 ae interprets Rogers' personality theory,
particularly its stress on self-actualization, to mean that
Rogers rejects any form of realism, that is, any body of hard,

34 M• nne , P. 18.
35Rogers, HA Theory ot Therapy • • • ttl in Kooh (ed.),

pp. 197, 222-23.

36Richard W. Dettering, "Philosophical Idealism in
Rogerian Psyohology," Educational Theo£l, V (1955), 206-214.
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inflexible taets, or any standard higher than the subJective. 3?
Dettering compares Rogers to John Dewey in reJeoting
static absolutes and in finding truth only in tbe realm of
experience; specifically, both Dewey and. Rogers stress the continult7 and un1 ty of e xperlenee and nature, the dynamism ot human
experience, the progressive freedom of the individual and the
,emergenoe ot a selt-directed purpose, and the goal of this personal emancipation as some type or sooial coheslveness. 38 But
~ettering

believes that there is also a big difterence between

the two.

Dewey's pragmatism, aocording to Detterins, represents

• convergence or Hegel and Darwin, of dialectical idealism and
empirical SCience, or individualism and socialism (in the sense
of social, objective, scientifio knowledge).

Dettering finds

that Rogers has the Hegelian but not the Darwinian side of Dewey,
that is, he lacks the three major elements of Darwin's philosophy
that are found in Dewey.39
The first of these is the concept of interaction.

Dewey

says that interaction means giving equal weight to both factors
of experience, the internal and external factors.
finds it ambiguous whether Dewey means by this what
have

meant-~!1

wb~~her

Dettering
D~Nin

would

objective, scientifically-reported phenomenon--or

it is to be considered as itselt a. private experieme

-

37Ibid ., 206.

-

38Ibid., 207.
39Ibid ., 207-210.

-
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involving only two interacting aspects of the experiential field
of a given subject; but be has no doubt that Rogers, with his
emphasis on the individual reacting tOuis personal percdptions,
accepts the latter interpretation.
Second is the notion of experiment and consequences.

The

experimental method depends upon regularities of nature, tor only
on this basis can conclusions be predicted; the whole method
would tall in a completely unpredictable universe.

But, Detter-

iog believest since Rogers rejects SOCially-acknowledged results
and

a~

external imposition of norms, the intersubjective, social

~erirication

of Dewey is replaced by a total intrasubjective ver-

~ict.

The third element is conflict and problem solving.

For

Dewey problems could be found introspectiVely, in the private
,

~orld

of experience, but neither understood nor solved except in

social and scientific terms.

Dettering finds that Rogers keeps

the notion of self-directed solution
~ewey

t~

problems but that unlike

he would keep the problem totally within tbe subjectts

personal perceptual field for both its comprehension

~

its

solution.
The general opposition which nettering finds running
through all three of these differenoes is tmcontrast between an
intersubjective and

aD.

introspective concept of knowledge: while

Dewey relied ultimately on the consensus ot the scientific comunity, Rogers rests on the process of self-disclosure.

Dett.ring
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applies to Rogers the same criticism which Dewey himself used

against introspectionism in general. rejecting the belief that
ftconsciousness or experience is the organ of its own immedia.te
disclosure of all its own. secrets," a view, Dewe;r says, which
arose with Descartes and Locke. 40
The fact that Rogers lacks the social aspect of Dewey is
ad enough in Dettering's eyes; but it is particularly objectionable in that Rogers seems to stretcb the subjective and individualistic side of pragmatism tar over into the idealist camp-so far, in fact, that Rogers' epistemology is compared to a
ysticism which eventually eDds with the subject in speechless
identification with the cosmos.
Finally, Dettering believes that tbe denial of interaubjective relationships leads to the insoluble problem of solipsiem.

Four comments will be made on these remarks of Dettering.
First. it must be pointed out that Rogers does not deny
all realism.

But it is true that according to his theory man e

never know reality and therefore can never regulate his life in
terms of objectivevaluea.

second, regarding the criticism that Rogers lacks the
Darwinian elements of Dewey, it must be said that, as we have
seen. Rogers does admit that there i8 a reality apart from. the
individual subject. that a part of scientific knowledge is its

210.
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verification by the scientific community, and that there is a
social reality based on the commonality of experience.

It is

true, however, that the major stress in Rogers' thinking, as with
that ot phenomenalistic psychology in general, lies on the subjective perceptions of the individual.
Third, the most obvious part of Rogers' entire theory ot
personality is his stress on the inherent drive within each indiidual toward selt-actualization, which drive manifests itself
in socialized behavior.

He does not deny, however, that this

drive may be checked by various factors. some of which are exteral and environmental.
Finally, when speaking in psychological terms, Rogers
oes make statements that seem to imply an ultimate denial of the
subject-object dichoto.,.
8i88.

But he would never admit to a solip-

A solipsist does not talk about interpersonal relation-

ships nor about the commonality ot knowledge and the validation
of scientific findings within a scientific community.
In summary, then, we have seen that although the impleation could be drawn from early writings that Rogers denied a
e.lity beyond subjective perception. he adjusted his theory to
dmit that such a reality may exist.

AS to whether this is

objective realit7, Rogers says that it may be but that an indiidual can never know it as such because it cannot be reaohed b7
the scientific procedure, the approach most like17 to reach
truth.

Rogers seems to have a Kantian view ot reality in placing

a dichoto

between the e
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lived in by men and the intelligible world which m&1 lie beyond
or behind this experiential world but which in
be known by man.

~

case can never

For this reason the theory is attacked by those

who hold a realist epistemology.

CHAPTER V
THEORY OF VALUES AND

TH~

GOOD LIFE

Rogers' theory ot values and his conception ot the good
lite, which rests upon the thEOry ot values. presuppose his
theory ot the nature of man and his epistemological principles.
Regarding the nature of man, it will be recalled that
each unique man naturally manifests a continual process of actualization in a fundamentally positive, social direction, and that
man is free to determine his own particular fulfillment.
Regarding Rogers' epistemology, we have seen that he has
rejected the idea that objeotive truth could ever be reached.
Reality tor the individual is his own subjective perception, his
own experience, which m87 or m&7 not oorrespond to what is
"really real."
Rogers' theory of values will be presented first, tollowed by the theory of the good lite.
In a paper written in 1962, Rogers acoepts the distinotions between three types of value. l The preterential behaVior
of any living being for one kind ot Object or objeotive rather
•

learl R. Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values: The
Valuing Prooess in the Mature Person M (unpublished paper dated
september, 1962), p. 3.
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than another is directed by the operative values ot that organlsm.

However a conceived value is proper only to man.

This

refers to the individual's preference for a symbolized object,
the individual usually toresees the results ot his action.

aDd

The third type ot value is an ObJective value; this signifies
what is objectively preferable whether it is conceived as such or
not.

But because Rogers does not know it objective truth exists

aDd, at any rate, is quite sure that it could not be known if it

did exist, he refrains from discussing what the significance of

an objective value might be.
BeCause an objective value cannot be known as such, good~.ss

or badness, at least as far as an individual is concerned,

is not found tlout there, If is not found intrinsic to an object or
experience. 2 The necessary alternative, therefore, is for an
individual to discover his values "within," to have an internal
locus of evaluation.

The rtwi thintt of an individual is. of

course, his sensory and visceral experience.

The only real cri-

terion of the worth of an object or activity is personal experience. values Cannot be meaninglessly imposed upon an individual
~y

any type ot external authority:

EXperience is, for me, the highest authoritz. The touchstone
10 otfier person's ideas,
and none of my o'nn ideas, are as authoritative as my experience. It is to experience that I must return again ani
again, to discover a closer approximation to truth as it is

of valIdI&y-rs my-own experIence.

2RogerS, Client-Centered Therapl ••• , p. 139.
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in the prooess of becoming in me.
Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor
research-neither the revelations of God. nor man--oan take
preoedence over my own direot experience.;
This criterion will be effective, however, only if the
individual accepts all of his experience.

Man must not value

only certain parts of his experience and thus guide his lite
according to partial evidence, rejecting the rest of his experience as evil or un'A'orthy or uncharacteristic of hill.

Rather man

must trust his entire organism, the totality of his lite-experiences. 4

It is possible to view this organismic base of valuing,
which the human ind.ividua1 shares with the rest ot the animal
~orldt

from an external scientific standpoint.

'rom this per-

spective, man functions like a giant electronic computer.;
is regulated

by

Lite

thermostatic controls in terms of various needs;6

and the organism is capable of receiving feedback information
~hich

permits adjustment of non-satisfying behaVior.

The organ-

ism would not be infallible; but beoause it would be open to all

pf its experience, the organiSlllio computing machine would be able
3Rogers, On Beeomins a Person • • • , pp. 23-24. Cf.,
aogers, Client-Centered ~eraPl • • • , pp. 149-50, 522-24.
4Rogers,
~uman

p. 24.

qn

Beoomin§ a Person • • • , pp. 118-19, 189-91.

5Ibid., pp. 190-91.

InCi!'VIdual • • • t

It

Cf., Rogers, "The potential of the
p. 18.

GRogere, "The Potential ot the Ruman Individual • •

• t

"

??
to quickly discover and oorreot an error in the

ligh~

of further

data.?
Rogers' statement that "man is wiser than his intellect ne
i8 to be interpreted in the light of his insistence that the
entire organism must be the base of valuing.

The intellectual

experience dependent upon awareness is, indeed, unique to man.
~ut,

as has been noted, it has a physiological base like any

other type ot experienoe; and, as only one part ot the totality
of experience, it cannot be the sole judge of goodness or badness.

Rogers' writings stress the importance of feelings and

intuition more than intelleotual knowledge in determining values
~or a

person.

In fact, intellectual knowledge can actually be a

hindrance to a person it this knowledge is of supposedly objective norms which are not experienced as relevant.
there is no need to "know" the correct values;

Therefore
data

through~e

supplied by his own organism an individual eanacperience what is
satisfying and enhancing.9

When an activity feels as though it

is valuable or worth doing, it 1s worth doing:
One of the basic things which I was a long time in realizing, and which I am still learning, is that when an activity feels as though it is valuable or worth dOing, it is
worth doIng. PUt another way, I have learned that my total

., .

?Rogers, "'l'oward a Modern APproach to Velues • •
p. 15, Rogers, On B.coaiES a person • • • , pp. 190-91.

8Rogers, ttThe potential of the Human Individual
pp. 10 t 14.

9Rogers, Client-Centered Therapl • • • , p. 523.

•

•

. , It
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organismic sensing of a situation is more trustworthy than my
intellect.
All of my professional life I have been going in directions which others thought were foolish, and about which I
have had many doubts myself. But I have never regretted
mOTing in directions which tttelt right," even though I have
often felt lonely or foolish at the time.
I have tound that when I have trusted some inner non10
intellectual sensing, I have discovered wisdom in the move.
TO give an outstanding example of such organismic valuillg, Rogers
quotes Einstein, who writes that for years he kept moving along
in the direction which he tel t to be right even though he could
not at the time give a rational explanation as to why this was
the direction he sought. ll
Values given by experienoe, therefore, can never be fixed
or rigid; for a.s the reality which an individual perceives

Changes as the gestalt of his self-structure changes, the value.

an individual places on this reality will change accordingly_
There will be a continual process of evaluation just as t here is
a continual process of actualization.

Ratber than twist exper-

ience to fit a preconceived structure, it is the fluid experience
of whut is eatit:tyiDg that will dete ..t'mine the good.• 12
Clear evidence of such a process of e valuation is .found in
the infant, whom we see naturally preferring experiences which
maintain, enhance, or actualize the organism in terms o.f
lORogere, On Beco.!!! a Person • • • , p. 22.
llRogers, HThe Potential of the Human Individual • • • ,"
pp. 10-11.

12RogerS, On Beco.1Ei a Person •• _, pp. 188-89.
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operative values.

At one moment the infant values food and, ,!'hen

satiated, is disgusted with it; at one moment he values stimulation, and soon after v&lues only rest.
criterion is actual sense experience.

The single import6!lt
This actualization process

is evident until the time comes when, because of his need for
love, the intant begins to establish conditions of worth based on
the introjected values of others and co.nsequently to distrust his
own experience. l ,
This same valuing process, with important differences, is
also evident in the mature adult.

Like the infant, the mture

adult does not hold values rigidly but finda them continually
changing.

He finds that general principles are not as useful as

sensitively discriminating reactions.

His valuing process is

fluid and flexible, based on internal experience.

As opposed to

the infant, however, the adult t a evaluation is much more c.omplex
and is in terms of conceived values by which past experience and
the realization of the future are taken into account. 14 It is
plear therefore tbat there can be no closed system ot beliefs nor
any unchanging set of principles by which a man can guide his

lite, tor experienoes are too varied and too complex ever to fit
into general formulae. 15

~p.

13Rogers, "Toward a Modern APproach to Values • •
3-7.
14-Ibid., pp. 12-15.

15Rogers,

On Becomi!l a Person • • • , p. 27.

., "
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From this denial that there is one philosophy or belief
or set of prlneiples for ever70ne and from l:,:ogers t contrary

emphasis on the necessity of having a constantly changing. internal locus of evaluation, it might appear that Rogers' theory is
an example of pure philosophical relativism that can only lead to
chaos and anarchy.
Rombauts believes that Rogers' valuing theory, based upon

the finding of values solely within an individual's sensory and
~isceral

experience, is an unjustifiable philosophical relativ-

He says that Rogers

ism.

accounts it one of the ends of therapy to bring the client to
the point where his own sense experience and physiologwal
experience support, not to say constitute, value. He comes
then to experience as valuable all that is for the good of
his own organism.
Apart from the 'ld;7stion of how this-sense experience is
able even'tuiIll to l.sC'iFii lUgner Var'iies t om con rnll-cOn~e that SEis conc6 tlo11 includes a aliilOiOrliICa ~el'ffiv
ism !2£--wni~ sins Ii jusEityIpg ~ !! of area. l

1

Menne also criticizes Rogers on this pOint.

He analyzes

the nature of man from the standpoint of traditional ethical
~hilosopby

and states that man tends toward an absolute end (God)

16Rombauts, 82:
•
•
zal het ~en van de doeleinden zijn van de therapia de
client ertoe te brengen op zijn eigen zintuigelijke en fysiologische ervaring te steunen om uit te maken wat waardevol
is. Hij gaat d an ale waara.a ervaren al wat het eigen organisme ten goede komt.
," Afsezien van (te vra~ hoe deze sensorische ervarif6
eventueel lio5ere-waardin we~te-erkenneat ian-men Dle
anners dan vaststeIlen da~ze-opvattI~ een fI!OsOlIich
rel£ltiv!iie insIuI~;waarvoor-geen enke~ rechtvaard!gl91
iOFd:t fieboden. If
Translated for this thesis by Peter J. Harvey, S.J.
It.
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and that actions which

in accord with this natural tendency
are objectively and absolutely gOOd. l ?
~e

Further, although Menne agrees with Rogers that values
must be meaningful to a person, he believes that Rogers goes too

far in the direction of rejecting values received from others
which are not here aDd now found personally meaningful.

Menne

believes that it is essential to pOint out that a part of mants
soeial nature is t hat man learns from others. and that this

includes accepting their values on ocoasion (for example, children from parents) even though these values bave not yet been
personally appropriated and integrated into onets life. 18
There is no doubt that Rogers is positing philosophical
relativism in the sense of making the value of an objeot or
experience oompletely dependent upon the SUbject.
on this point 1s clear.
~estructiye

His insistence

However he does not believe that this is

eIther of the individual or of society.

First ot all it must be remembered that at the oore of
~ogersf

philosophy is a oontident trust in the on-going drive of

the individual toward actualization.

The deepest

~oots

of man

are good and positive-direoted, and Rogers believes that if the
~ndividual

is congruent his conduct will lead to his true

enhancement as a human being.
l?Menne, pp. 3?-40.
18p?i!1., pp. 40-42.

What teels right is right for the
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congruent individual; as open to all of his experience his judgment is made in the light of all the relevant data, and his judgment w111 lead to self-actualizing behavior.
second, Rogers believes that the enhancement ot individuals will not conflict with that of society as a whole; for there
is an orga,Diamic commonality of value directions in the persons

ot every culture who are moving toward greater and greater congruence. 19

Rogers finds the explanation of this in the fact that

men are all members of the same human. species.

All individuals

have the same basic needs, and one of theae is the need for
SOCialized behavior: "To achieve a close, intimate, real, fully
communicative relationship with another person seems to meet a
deep need in every individual, and is ver,r highly valued*"20
Again, it is only the incongruent individ.ual--the man who is less
than fully man--who values behavior that conflicts with the needs
of others.
The behavior, therefore, of the individual who is true to
his organismic valuing process w1l1 enhance himself and yet will
not conflict with others either in his own community or in
another culture.

Even though a particular individual would not

have a consistent nor even a stable system of conceived values,
the directions ot t he valuing process would be constant across
19RogerS, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values • • • ,"
pp. 16-20; Rogers, On Becomip.g a person" " ., p. 187.
p. 18.

20Rogers, JtToward a Modern Approach to Values" "

.t

ft
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culture and across time.

Rogers therefore admits the fact of

universal values but feels that he is reaching the d.emonstration
of this fact by a route different from that along which his
readers might be accustomed to travel:
'inally. it appears that we have returned. to the issue of
universality of values, but by a different route. Instead of
universal values t'out there, tt or It universal value system
imposed by some group--philosophers, rulers, or priests--we
have the possibility of universal human value directions
emerging from the experiencing of the human organism. Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social
values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process. The
suggestion 1s that though modern man no longer trusts relition or science or philosophy nor a~ system of beliefs to
give him his values, he may find an organismiC valuing base
wrtnin himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch
with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive and social
appr9ach to the perplexing value issues which face all of
us. 21

Rogers is, then, clearly opposing his valuing theor,r to
what he conceives to "be more traditional theories which men have
accepted.

It might be pOinted out. however, that the attempt to

explain values in terms of an ana17sis of man's nature is as old
as the Greeks.

Bertocci and Millard ask whether it is not clear

that psychologists like Rogers who attempt to discover motivational needs based upon the intrinsic nature of man "are in tact
on the intention of the natural-law moralist as they
~erret out permanent. universal needs?N 22 The traditional
~arrying

21 Ibid., p. 20.

-

22peter A. Bertocci and Richard M. Millard, personali~
and the Good, Ps,ychological and Ethical Perspectives (New yo~:
!DaVl.C1 MCKay co., Inc., J. '10' ), p. J.14.
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natural-law moralist would not admit with Rogers that all experience is rooted in sensor.y and visceral experience and would
strese the role of the intellect in judging values more than doe.
Rogers, but he too would look upon tbe only valid explanation of
the valuing process to be one based upon man's concrete human
nature.
~alues

Inasmuch, then, as Rogers admits a universality of
based upon human nature, he is not differing from the tra-

~itlonal

explanation of values as much as he believes.

The

adversary against which he sets himselt--an adversary who
~elieves

that the universality of values comes only trom an

authoritarian imposition from "without" rather than arising from
the needs and desires ot man's concrete nature--is hardly in the
truly Mtraditional" philosophic stream.

In bis 1961 book, as a prefatory remark to the section
concerned with what Rogers oalls na philosophy of persons," he
rems.rks that

If

I have formed some philosophical impressions of the

life .and goal toward which the individual moves when he is

-free. ,,23

One of the questions '.lJhich has most concerned Rogers,

as it must any therapist, is the question of the good life.What
ie the goal or goals of life toward which clients, and all men,

tend?

Given the universality of human nature and the consequent

universality of the value dlreotlonswhich men who are inwardly
free manifest, whatl description of the 11.1'e which is good to live
will be aost adequate to the experience ot seeing oneself and

23Rogers, On Becoming a Person ••

*'

p. 161.
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others move in these directions?
That this is not a pseudo-problem is clearly recognized
~y

Rogers.

The question ot the purpose of life has been asked b7

men of all ages, and each man has formulated an answer either
explicitly or implicitly and lives his life accordingly.

One

evident fact, however, is that neither the men of the past nor
the men of the present have agreed on the answer a
When men in the past have asked themselves the purpose of
life, some have answered, in the words of t he catechism, that
"the ohief end of man is to glorify God." Others have
thought of life's purpose as being the preparation of oneself
for immortality. Others have settled on a much more earthy
goal--to enJoy and release and ~atisfy every sensual desire.
Still others--and this applies to m~ today--regard the purpose of life as being to acbieve--to gain material possessions, status, knowledge, power. Some have made it their
goal to give themselves completely and devotedly to a cause
outside ot themselves such a8 Christianity. or Oommunisa. A
Hitler bas seen hia goal as that of becoming the leader ot a
master race which would exercise power over all. In sharp
constrst. many an Oriental bas striven to eliminate all personal desires, to exercise the utmost of control over himself.24
Rogers however does not;

choo~!le

to deseri-be the good lite

in -terms of any of these or similar possible answers.
ce'p~ion

His con-

of the good life is basically an outgrowth of his ih eo ry

of values.

Just as he has a process theory of values--there are

no immutable values which invariably hold tor all people at all
times--so he has a process cheery of the good life.
Rogers is within the existential stream of psychology
when he views the question from the standpoint of process. and,
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~n

fact, he turns to the existentialist philosopher Kierkegaard

~or

a concise formulation of the answer, believing that the aim

of life wbich best reflects the psychotherapeutic experience of
~an's

dynamic process of development is expressed in Kierke-

~aard's words--"to
~aard

E.!

that self which one truly is.,,25

Kierke-

states that the most common form of despair is the despa.ir

of not willing to be oneself but that the deepest despair is tbe
despair ot willing to be another than oneself; the opposite of
iespair, on the other hand, is to actually will to be that self
which one truly is, and this choice is the deepest responsibility

ot man. 26
What does it mean to become the self whioh one truly is?
First of all this becoming may be stated negatively, in terms of
the person does not do.

~hat

As an individual comes closer to

ideal of the hypothetical fully-functioning person, he will

~he

.ove further and further away from hiding behind faya.des, away
~rom

belng a self which be is not, that is, away from havinG a

~elf-ooncept

~ence

which is not true to all of the

of the organism.

pf his experience
~s

~1gnificant

exper-

No longer will he deny or distort aspects

because ot a threat to a self-structure which

not true to the whole.

Such an indivldual will mOve

aw~

from

25spren Klerke g aard The Sickness unto neath, trans. with
introduction by walter 1owrie (prInceton: PrInceton Univ.
fress, 1941), p. 29. Quoted in Rogers, O~_Becomlns a Person
• • • , p. 166.
~D

26C1ted in Rogers, On Becomi!l a Person • • • , p. 110.
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guiding his life accord.ing to floughtsll which are meaningless to
him as a pereon, and thereby away from trying to please others by

conforming to their ex-pectations of what he should or should not
do. 2?
On -the contrary, the good life will be a fluid and
changing process

£f. becoming, a life in which a person is not

disturbed to realize that he is constantly changing in terms of
new experience, a life in which a person is content to be a process, not a product.

Rogers accepts K1erkegaa.rd*s characteriza.-

tion of the truly existing person:
An existing individual is constantly in proeess of becoming.

• • • and translates all his thinking into terms ot process.
It is with (him) • • • as it is with s writer and his style;
for he only has a style who never has anything finished, but
ttmoves the waters of the language" every time be begins, so
thatt;he most common expression comes into being for him witb
the freshness of a new mirth. 28
For Rogers. then, as for Kierkegaard, existence is a process ot
becoming.

This is reflected in the title of Rogers' most reeent

book: On Becoming a Person.
The good life "lPlill be charaeterized by increasing selt-

acceptance a.nd therefore by increasing congruence bet'.lleen the
self-concept and the organismic v3luing process, based upon an
openness to the totality and complexity of his experience.

The

2?Ibid •• pp. 167-70.

-

28spren Kierkegaard, conClUdirt Unscientific postscri~t.
trans. David F. Swensen, completea a er his death ana provi ed
with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie (princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1944 ), p. 79. Quoted in Rogers, On Becollling a Person • • • , p. 1?2.
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rully-functioning person will move towead greater selr... direction,
accepting responsibility for himself and choosing the gpals
toward which he wants to move. 29

-

Further, it will be a life in which the individual
becomes more acceptant of other persons and ex.periences an ever
greater need for true interpersonal relationships in which he can
manifest himself

8.S

he actually is.

Rogers discusses this basic

universal need in terms of Martin Bubar's "I-Thou" relationship:
There is an obvious hunger to be one's feelings, to be known
and accepted for what one is, to communicate one's self in
genuine terms, not 8.S a !&yade. • t • The human being wants,
clearly, to be fully known aIld fully accepted in a relationship_
When such an experience occurs, as it does with 80me frequency in therapy, but also in other life situations, it partakes of' the charactieristics which Martin Buber has so well
described as the "I-Thou" relationship. It has no concern
with t1me, with practicalities, with differences of status or
role, not even a concern with consequences. It is simply the
deep mutual experience of spec,king truly to one anoth er as
persons, as we are, as we feel, without hold.illG back, without
putting on. As Bubar v,;ell points out, this deep III-Thou"
experience is not one '""hieh Can be maintained, but unless it
oceurs from ti;ue to time the individual i.8 cheated ot hie
full potential development.. It is one of the experiences
which makes a mall truly human.'O
The only control of behavior will be the natura.l and
internal balanoing of nee ls and the d.iscovery of behavior which
i

follows the vector most closely approximsting the satisfaction

/

or

29 or ., Rogers, On Becoming a Person • • • , pp. 107-124,
170-76; Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy • • • ,If In Koch (ad.),

pp. 234-35; Rogers, It'roward a Modern APproach to Values • • ..
pp. 16-18.

til

30Rogers. "The potential of the Human Individual • • • ,n
p. 15. ct., Rogers and Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and
Carl Rogers, It pp. 10-15.
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all needs.

The experience ot extreme satisfaction ot one need

(tor example, sex) in a way to do violence to other needs (tor
example, tender relationships)--a common experience in deten-

8ivel~ organized persons--will be decreased.;l

Such a person

will participate in the vastly oomplex selt-regulatory activities
of his organism in suoh a tashion as to live in increasing har~ony

with himselt and others.

The fully-funotioning person will

~ind

that such a lite will not be without problems, but it will

be satisfying for he will be true to himselt in meeting lite and
the obstaoles which it presents.

Becoming oneselt is not an easy

task, nor one that is ever completed.

It is a continuing. coura-

geous w~ of lite.~2

The actions of the fully-functioning person, therefore,
be meaningful manitestations ot his basic drive toward self-

~ill

.otualization, made in terms of true values--values tbat have
!personal significance.
~rings organ1smicall~

The good will be that whicb actually
experienced satisfaction that maintains and '

!enbances the entire organisll both in the immediate present and
~ons1dered

from a long-range standpOint.

since the good lite is a process or a direction, not a
~tate

of being or a destination, Rogers emphasizes that it does

~ot

imply fixity or rigidity.

He therefore rejects the idea that

~be

goal of lite 1s a state ot happiness that is aChieved once
31Rogers, On Becomi!i a Person ••
32Ibid., pp. 181, 196.

-

't

p. 195.
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and. for all:

It seems to me tbat the good life is not aD7 fixed state. It
is not, in my estimation, a state of virtue, or contentment,
or nirvana, or happiness. It is not a condition in which the
individual is adjusted, or fulfilled, or actualize.. To use
psychological terms, it is not a state of drive-reduction, or
tension-reduction, or homeostasis.
I believe tbat allot these terms have been used in ways
which imply that if one or several of these states is
achieved, tben the goal ot life has been achieved."
Here again Rogers is echoing Kierkegaard, who states that tbe
~ontinual

process of striving to become oneself does not mean

that the person has a static goal which he acbieve. onee and for

all.~4

(J.Dd here again it might be pointed out that such a

static and rigid value-theory as Rogers is refuting cannot be
identified as the truly traditional Talue-theor,r.

Bo contempo-

rary philosopher who is working within the tramework ot the
~estern

philosophic tradition wouldthtnk ot need-reduction and

nappiness as the same Or of virtue and homeostasis as equivalent.)
Menne criticizes Rogers for rejecting happiness, but as
be himself admits he does not mean by it the same thing as
Rogers.

Menne is looking at happiness as the goal of man's

actions and, ultimately, as tbe state of perfeot fulfillment in
GOd,35 whereas Rogers 1s de~ingt as Kierkegaard does, that man

33 Ibid., pp. 185-86. Cf., Ibid., p. 176; Rogers and
~kinner, "'Sciiie Issues Concerning t1ii"1Jontrol of Human Behavior, tt

1062.

74Ilerkegaard, Conoluding Unsoientific PostscriEt.
84-85.
35uQnnQ

nn.

"A_"Q
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could ever reach a static goal of complete actualization in this
life.
Finally, Rogers believes that his theory of the good life
i$ not limited to individual applicatien but can a180 be extended
on a social level to groups, organizations, and even nations.

Soclal groups will find, as do individuals. that it is a deeply
rewarding experience to face and accept the reality of lifeX,6

experiences, to become what each one truly is./
Of.,

36Rogers, On B.oomi~ a Person • • • , pp. 178-80.
tl A Tneory o!erapy • • .," 1.n Koch (ed.) t

Rogers,

pp. 192-94, 235-44.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In accord with the purpose of this thesis, we have considered the major philosophical implications of Carl Rogers' theory
of personality, presenting both Rogers' positions and the major
criticism to which these various positions have been subjected.

In conclusion, let us draw together in a rew remarks some of the
main themes that run through Rogers· writings.
Clearly, the fundamental concern of Rogers is a modern
concern quite in touch with the contemporary world: the personhood ot man.

He asks the questions, what is personhood and how

does man achieve it?

At the root ot Rogers' answer we find a

confident, optimistic trust in the basic goodness of man.

Rogers

is aware ot the evil in the world that is caused by man and to
which man is subjected; but he centers his attention beneath
these layers of cruelty and degradation and finds at the core ot
the human personality a positive, on-going drive toward true tulfilment of the individual person.

When man is free to lecome him-

self, he realizes his value and dignity as a human person and
acts in such a way that he personally and society as a whole will
be enhanced.

Man is good, his actions are soc1ally constructive,

and he consciously tends toward a self-ideal that embodies his
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full potentiality.
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Rogers therefore stands out as a spokesman

tor the responsible dignity of human nature in a dete.I'ministical~-mind.d

age which bas cast serious doubts on both man's

responsibility and man's fundamental goodness.
Rogers approaches man trom an existential rather than what
might be called an essential V'iewpolnt.

His concern is with a

concrete man immersed in a world ot hopes and loves and dreams
and hates.

He watches the stream ot man's development, the pro-

cess of mants becoming.

Life, be finds, is deeper than logic;

the breadth of man-in-the-world cannot be captured in intellectual formulae.

Man must open himself to the fullness of his

experience and guide the currents of his development according to
~alues

that are peesonally felt, personally meaningful.

Life is

not static but an existential stream of creative growth.

Man

commits himself to accept responsibly the direction of his own
self-fulfilment.
The emphasis, therefore, is on the subjective, that is, on
wersonally appropriated knowledge in a Kierkegaardean sense.

I

d.o not uncritically accept the values o:f others and behave
according to their expectations unless I myself have found personal meaning in these values.

In a sense, then, man 1s the mea-

sure of all things; objects and values *hat stand outsiae the
~bit

of what I find personally meaningful can hardly take pre-

eedenee over those that I experience as tru17 fulfilling.
Man, therefore, is seen in an existential context; for the
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depth of his reality cannot be objectified from an external scientific standpoint.

The inner wealth of his

b~ing

can only be

grasped from within, from the core of subjectivity in which the
individual person lives and struggles to achieve the manhood that
~e i8

oapable of becomiD6.
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